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INTRODUCTION
Today the United States is executing a group of people who were likely
protected from such punishment in 1791. When the Eighth Amendment was
ratified, categorical protections prohibited the execution of people described as
"idiots" or "lunatics," collectively referred to as persons non compos mentis. As
an initial definitional matter, it may be helpful to analogize "idiots" to people
with intellectual disabilities (formerly called mental retardation) and "lunatics"
to people with mental illness -although these analogies are certainly oversim-
plifications. In fact, the accuracy and scope of these transhistorical analogies are
at the heart of this Note.
The Eighth Amendment expressly proscribes "cruel and unusual punish-
ments,"' and this prohibition takes two forms. First, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits those punishments that were considered "cruel and unusual" at the
time of the Amendment's adoption.2 Second, a punishment is "cruel and unu-
sual" if it violates the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."3
Death penalty jurisprudence and scholarship focus almost exclusively on
the latter formulation.4 This is unsurprising- at least from an historical per-
spective. Eighteenth-century common law permitted the execution of felons,'
and the Framers contemplated capital punishment in the Constitution.6 The
first Congress, for instance, adopted a statute authorizing the execution of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
3. Id. at 4o6 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, lOl (1958) (plurality opinion)).
4. I am aware of only two sources arguing for more expansive insanity protections based on
eighteenth-century common law protections. However, these sources, unlike this Note, do
not focus on idiocy; they do not discuss the inaccuracies of the Court's historical analysis in
Penry v. Lynaugh and Atkins v. Virginia; and they do not provide similar prescriptive sugges-
tions. See Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians in Support of Petitioner, Panetti v. Quar-
terman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (No. o6-647); Eric L. Shwartz, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and
the Framers' Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315 (199o). The
Brief of Legal Historians provides a strong, concise argument that Scott Panetti would have
been considered a lunatic in 1791 and therefore protected from execution. This brief was in-
fluential in my research, and I am indebted to its authors: Paul Brand, Thomas A. Green,
Stanley N. Katz, Eben Moglen, Jonathan Rose, and the late A.W. Brian Simpson.
S. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-202 (1971) (reviewing the common law histo-
ry of executing individuals convicted of felonies).
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177 (1976) ("It is apparent from the text of the Constitution
itself that the existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers."). Moreover,
punishments such as branding, flogging, and mutilation were acceptable. See LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1993).
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seamen for theft of "any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars."7 In
light of this well-known history, those who oppose the death penalty largely
ignore the original public meaning of the Eighth Amendment and instead fo-
cus on "evolving standards of decency." As John Stinneford notes, "[t]he
Court's nonoriginalists ... have steadfastly refused even to consult the original
intent of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause."8 As a result, Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has focused primarily on the "evolving standards of
decency" and overlooked the common law's strong prohibition against the exe-
cution of people called "idiots."9
The Supreme Court has discussed common law insanity protections on
three occasions: Ford v. Wainwright;' Penry v. Lynaugh;" and Justice Scalia's
dissent in Atkins v. Virginia.2 In Penry and Justice Scalia's dissent in Atkins, the
Justices argued that common law protections for "idiots" protected only those
who were "profoundly or severely retarded" and not those who were moderate-
ly or mildly mentally retarded.13 This Note challenges that claim. It shows that
both English and colonial common law rejected capital punishment for "idi-
ots," and that the legal and public understanding of "idiocy" in 1791 was
broader than the understanding proposed by the Court.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I frames the discussion by outlining
common law notions of "cruel and unusual," the contours of the Eighth
Amendment, and early insanity protections. Part II critiques the Supreme
Court's historical analyses in Penry and Atkins, and shows that the Court relied
7. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, S 8, 1 Stat.
114 (1790).
8. John Stinneford, The Original Meaning of 'Unusual': The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 1O2 Nw. U. L. REv. 1739, 1743 (2008).
9. Ideology may also play a role in this oversight. Originalism, as a modality of constitutional
interpretation, is generally associated with ideological conservatism. See Keith E. Whitting-
ton, Is Originalisn Too Conservative?, 34 HAnv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 29 (2011) ("Originalism
as an approach to constitutional theory and constitutional interpretation is often associated
with conservative politics."). And conservatives are less likely to oppose the death
penalty than liberals. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Death Penalty Support Stable at 63%: Decade-Long
Decline in Support After 2001 Seen Mostly Among Democrats, GALuP (Jan. 9, 2013), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/15977o/death-penalty-support-stable.aspx [http://perma.cc/DGZ8
-TYTT]. This misalignment of interpretive modality and death penalty support may have
contributed to the legal community's longstanding neglect of idiocy protections. Other pos-
sible reasons- the thin historical record and the academy's general lack of interest in intel-
lectual disability- are discussed in the introduction to Part III.
10. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
11. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
12. '536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Penty, 492 U.S. at 305, 333.
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on post-ratification disability models (such as eugenic and phrenological mod-
els) to construct a narrow definition of "idiocy." When the Court did use pre-
ratification sources, it selectively quoted or relied on atypical cases. Part III re-
assesses common law insanity protections for "idiots," finding that notions of
"idiocy" were not limited to those who were "profoundly or severely" mentally
retarded; instead, "idiocy" encompassed a relatively wide range of intellectual
disabilities. Most notably, this Part demonstrates that colonial and early Amer-
ican legal scholars relied on Matthew Hale's test to determine criminal liability
for "idiots": people whose mental abilities were below those of an ordinary
child of fourteen were not liable for felony or treason. 4 Part IV explores how
this historical reassessment might affect contemporary death penalty litigation.
Relying on the fourteen-year-old rule, it appears that a subset of the prisoners
on death row with intellectual impairments would likely have qualified as "idi-
ots" in 1791 and therefore should be exempted from execution today.
There are two important prefatory comments. First, the historical language
in this Note - like the terms "idiot" and "lunatic" - likely sound jarring to the
reader. And they should. The contemporary meanings of these words are
heavily laden with a painful history of mistreatment and marginalization of
people with intellectual disabilities and mental illness.'5 Unfortunately, due to
the historical nature of this inquiry, it is necessary to use the terms from the
relevant eras to avoid anachronism. Replacing the word "idiot" with the phrase
"intellectual disability" would obscure the historical question that this Note
seeks to answer: namely, who was considered an "idiot" and thereby afforded
special protections at the end of the eighteenth century?
14. See i SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 30 (William S. Hein &
Co. 2007) (1736).
15. For more information on the impact of pejorative labels on people with intellectual disabili-
ties, see, for example, Soeren Palumbo & Tim Shriver, What's Wrong with 'Retard'?,
HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.conVsoeren-palumbo/spread-the-word-to-end-the-word b_2819328.html [http://perma.cc
/3 PPA-H6YS] (highlighting the comments of Jonathan Franklin Stephens, a self-advocate
and author with Down syndrome: "So, what's wrong with 'retard'? I can only tell you what
it means to me and people like me when we hear it. It means that the rest of you are exclud-
ing us from your group. We are something that is not like you and something that none of
you would ever want to be. We are something outside the 'in' group. We are someone that
is not your kind.").
For an academic analysis of the transition from the phrase "mental retardation" to "in-
tellectual disability," see Robert L. Shalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Un-
derstanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DIS-
ABILITIES 116 (2007). Also note that the Supreme Court recently transitioned to the phrase
"intellectual disability." See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) ("Previous opinions
of this Court have employed the term 'mental retardation.' This opinion uses the term 'intel-
lectual disability' to describe the identical phenomenon.").
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Fidelity to the historical language is particularly necessary when studying
idiocy because the subject contains an elusive and unstable vocabulary. As his-
torian Patrick McDonagh notes, "[a] nyone wanting to understand the history
of the idea of intellectual disability and its various genealogical precursors, such
as idiocy, must contend with the slipperiness of the key terms .... With con-
cepts as slippery as 'idiocy' and its kin, this task is imposing, but critical ....
This slipperiness is inevitable as the vocabulary of idiocy expands and contracts
in response to scientific, religious, and sociocultural factors. Instead of at-
tempting to establish an exhaustive taxonomy of mental disability, this Note
explains key terms as needed.
The second prefatory comment regards originalism. This Note argues that
the original meaning of the "cruel and unusual" clause incorporates the com-
mon law prohibition against executing idiots. Furthermore, it argues that the
public meaning of the term "idiot" captures a broader group of people than
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Penry and Justice Scalia's dissent in At-
kins. To make this argument, this Note employs original meaning theories of
constitutional interpretation, which ask what the constitutional text meant to a
neutral reader at the time of adoption."7 As Justice Scalia notes, this approach
relies on the writings of "intelligent and informed people of the time" to under-
stand "how the text of the Constitution was originally understood.' 8 This task
"requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the
time- somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier
age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loy-
alties that are not those of our day." 9 After determining how an "intelligent
and informed" person understood the text in 1791, this Note proceeds to ab-
stract "the constitutional principle away from the immediate expectations of
the [F]ramers and [R]atifiers" in order to apply those principles today.' While
this Note employs an originalist methodology, it does not enter the larger de-
bate regarding the merits of originalism.'
16. PATRICK MCDONAGH, IDIOCY: A CULTURAL HISTORY 5 (20o8).
17. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 Hous. L. REv. 1O67,
1074 (2015).
18. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
19. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856-57 (1989).
20. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1075 (citing JACK M. BALKIN, LrVING ORIGINALISM (2011)); Steven
Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism, 1o3 Nw. U. L. REv. 663
(2009)).
21. Like work by John Stinneford, this Note proceeds from a modest set of assumptions:
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I. FRAMING THE CONVERSATION
This Part frames the discussion by outlining three underlying premises.
First, there are two ways in which a punishment may violate the Eighth
Amendment: i) it was considered "cruel and unusual" when the Eighth
Amendment was adopted in 1791 (the original meaning approach);' or 2) it
violates the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society" (the evolving standards of decency approach). Second, because the
Eighth Amendment incorporated the rights and protections afforded by Eng-
lish common law, the original meaning approach should investigate both Eng-
lish and colonial sources to determine the Amendment's meaning in 1791.
Third, English and colonial common law considered it "cruel" to execute an in-
sane person- a category that included idiots and lunatics.
A. The Two Ways in Which a Punishment May Violate the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."'23 As
discussed above, the Supreme Court has long held that there are two ways in
which a punishment may violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause:
first, if the punishment was considered "cruel and unusual" when the Amend-
ment was adopted;' or second, if the punishment violates the "evolving stand-
(1) that the original meaning of the text is relevant to constitutional interpreta-
tion, whatever one's position in the larger originalism/nonoriginalism debate; (2)
that it is therefore worthwhile to seek to determine the original meaning of con-
stitutional text where that meaning has previously been ignored or underdevel-
oped; and (3) that if one can determine the original meaning of the constitutional
text, one should examine the effect one's conclusions may have on existing consti-
tutional doctrine, particularly where the affected doctrinal area suffers from inco-
herence or instability-as does the Supreme Court's current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1743-44.
22. Some scholars argue that this is not the "original meaning" approach but rather the "origi-
nal expected application" approach. For a discussion of "original meaning" and "original ex-
pected application" see Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 293 (2007).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
24. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) ("There is now little room for doubt that the
Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those
modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that
the Bill of Rights was adopted."); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("Although the
Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English
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ards of decency."2' Initially, the Court primarily relied on the original meaning
approach: the Court's earliest Eighth Amendment cases proceeded by "'looking
backwards for examples by which to fix the meaning of the clause,' concluding
simply that a punishment would be 'cruel and unusual' if it were similar to
punishments considered 'cruel and unusual' at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted."' 6 In 1878, the Court in Wilkerson v. Utah first indicated that the
Amendment was not strictly tethered to eighteenth-century notions of cruel-
ty.2 The second approach was later recognized in 1958 in Trop v. Dulles, in
which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."28
Since Trop, the Court has determined that either of these methods may
show that a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. 9 While subsequent
death penalty litigation has focused almost exclusively on the evolving stand-
ards of decency, the Court never abandoned the original meaning approach.
Indeed, on several occasions the Court reiterated the unconstitutionality of
punishments that were considered cruel and unusual in 1791.30 Moreover, the
Court has consistently outlined a two-fold approach to its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Justice Scalia articulated this bifurcated approach as follows:
Under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a punishment is "cruel
and unusual" if it falls within one of two categories: "those modes or
acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the
counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that
they intended to provide at least the same protection .... ").
25. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
26. Furman v. Georgia, 4o8 U.S. 238, 264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (191o)).
27. In Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court noted that "it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture,
such as those mentioned by [Blackstone]" are cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amend-
ment. 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). Because such punishment was permissible at the time of the
Framing, this statement departed from a strict adherence to eighteenth-century notions of
cruelty.
28. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
29. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989); Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-08; see also
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 6o8 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contrasting the "origi-
nal meaning" approach and "evolving standards of decency" approach).
30. See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 ("At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punish-
ment considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted."); Ford, 477
U.S. at 405 ("There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel
and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that
had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.").
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time that the Bill of Rights was adopted," and modes of punishment
that are inconsistent with modern "standards of decency," as evinced by
objective indicia, the most important of which is "legislation enacted by
the country's legislatures. ""
As these modes developed, the original meaning approach became recognized
as a "constitutional floor." In Ford v. Wainwright, Justice Marshall stated that
"[t]here is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cru-
el and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the
Bill of Rights was adopted."32 While the evolving standards of decency are
adaptable, the floor is not. The Eighth Amendment cannot provide less protec-
tion than it did in 1791."3 In contrast to the floor set by the original meaning
approach, the evolving standards of decency set the outer boundaries of Eighth
Amendment protection. While there has been considerable debate regarding
these outer boundaries, there is little discussion of the floor. 4 In Parts III and
IV, this Note argues that the Court should restore the constitutional floor by
enforcing the idiocy protections that existed when the Eighth Amendment was
adopted. As discussed in more detail in Part IV, restoring the constitutional
floor does not require abandoning the evolving standards of decency. The two
methods can work in tandem.
31. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339-40 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added).
33. This dual approach to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence seems to assume a Whiggish in-
terpretation of history: the protections provided in 1791 serve as a constitutional "floor" be-
cause the progress of history inevitably moves toward greater liberty and enlightenment.
The phrase "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
seems to imply such a straightforward progression. However, this Note complicates that as-
sumption. It shows that the "evolving standards of decency" do not protect certain offenders
who likely were protected by the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment. For general
information on the Whiggish view of history, see HERBERT BUrERFIELD, THE WHIG IN-
TERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931).
34. See, e.g., Ford, 477 U.S. at 405; accord Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("Although
the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its Eng-
lish counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof
that they intended to provide at least the same protection -including the right to be free
from excessive punishments."); see also David L. Rumley, Comment, A License To Kill: The
Categorical Exemption of the Mentally Retarded From the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1299, 1305 (1993) ("The exculpation of "idiots" from the death penalty has long been recog-
nized and is now firmly ingrained in English and American common-law jurisprudence.").
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B. The Common Law Roots of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment's drafting history shows that the Framers intend-
ed to include the protections and rights established in English common law.
The English Bill of Rights was enacted on December 16, 1689, and it stated
that "excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."" The Virginia Declaration of Rights
incorporated the exact wording of the English Bill of Rights, and the Eighth
Amendment, in turn, was directly based on the Virginia Declaration of
Rights. 6
The author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, George Mason, explained
his draftsmanship: "[w]e claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of Eng-
lishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our Brethren
in Great Britain .... We have received [these rights] from our Ancestors, and,
with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired to our Posterity."3 7 Both
the Supreme Court"8 and legal scholars3 9 agree that by adopting this language,
the Framers intended to guarantee at least those protections afforded under
English law. In Solem v. Helm, the Court stated that "[a]lthough the Framers
may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its Eng-
lish counterpart, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is con-
vincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same protection.
35. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the
Crown, 1 Wil. & Mar. 2d Sess., c. 2 (1689), reprinted in 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS,
1660-1714, at 124 (Andrew Browning ed., 1953).
36. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (stating that the language of the Eighth
Amendment was taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689); ALLEN NEVINS, THE AMER-
ICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION: 1755-1789, at 146 (1924) (noting that the
Declaration of Rights "was a restatement of English principles -the principles of Magna
Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Commonwealth Parliament, and the Revolution of
1688").
37. Letter to the Committee of Merchants in London (June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE MASON 71 (Robert Rutherland ed., 1970).
38. Solem, 277 U.S. at 285-86 ("When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the lan-
guage of the English Bill of Rights, they also adopted the English principle of proportionali-
ty. Indeed, one of the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the rights of
English subjects.").
39. See, e.g., JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS' EIGHTH AMENDMENT 177 (2011) (arguing that adopting the verbatim language of
the English Bill of Rights was intended to "ensure that Americans would enjoy the same
rights as Englishmen").
40. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The colonists were particularly faithful to English criminal law. While
scholars note that colonists deviated from English law in some respects (form-
ing "indigenous law"), this was generally not the case with criminal law.41
When the colonists did deviate from English criminal law, they tended to move
in the "direction of leniency" by "giving judges alternatives to the death penal-
ty. )'4 Because the Eighth Amendment incorporated the same protections as the
English Bill of Rights, the following historical inquiry investigates the protec-
tions afforded to idiots in both English and colonial common law.43
C. It Was "Cruel" To Execute an Idiot
English common law considered it "cruel" to execute idiots, lunatics, and
the insane. The term most commonly used to describe these protected groups
was "non compos mentis" or simply "the insane."' In Ford v. Wainwright, Justice
Marshall outlined the "impressive historical credentials" in English common
law that prohibited the execution of the insane.4' He surveyed the works of
Edward Coke (1552-1634), Matthew Hale (16o9-1676), John Hawles (1645-
1716), William Hawkins (1673-1746), and William Blackstone (1723-178o) who
described the execution of the insane as "savage and inhuman,,, 6 a "miserable
41. See, e.g., BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIALAMERICA, 1606-166o, at 7 (1983)
("In law concerning crimes against the person, the colonists heavily favored the English law
...."); see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 874-928 (2009) (providing an overview of
the extent to which various colonial laws departed from English law in noncriminal matters,
such as property, contract, tort, family law, and the law of slavery).
42. CHAPIN, supra note 41, at 8; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
33 (2005) ("Neither in theory nor in practice was colonial law very bloodthirsty. There were
fewer capital crimes on the books than in England. In England, death was a possible pun-
ishment for many thieves; in Massachusetts, only for repeaters."); PETER CHARLES HOFFER,
LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 113 (revised ed. 1998) ("Colonial criminal law fol-
lowed the contours of English criminal law but was never as severe.").
43. The legal relationship between the North American colonies and England was quite com-
plex. For an extended analysis, see HOFFER, supra note 42, at 1-26 (analyzing this relation-
ship).
44. Beverly's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 123b, in 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 568 (photo. reprint
2002) (1826) (defining non compos mentis). This schema was also cited by Matthew Hale and
subsequent legal dictionaries. See, e.g., 3 GILES JACOB, THE LAw-DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING
THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW 370 (photo. reprint 2000)
(T.E. Tomlins, ed. 1811).
45. Ford, 477 U.S. at 4o6.
46. Id. (citing 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25).
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spectacle,"47 and "of extreme inhumanity and cruelty." 4s This prohibition was
effectively unwavering. As Justice Marshall noted: "We know of virtually no
authority condoning the execution of the insane at English common law."4"
The common law offered varying rationales for the prohibition on execut-
ing the insane: the practice "simply offends humanity"; it provides no general
deterrence; it denies the condemned an opportunity to find peace with God;
and "madness is its own punishment" ("furiosus solo furore punitur"),s0 Alt-
hough Justice Marshall did not find a consistent justification, he nonetheless
acknowledged the force of the prohibition because "whatever the reason of the
law is, it is plain the law is so."' Since Ford, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
these protections. At the beginning of her historical analysis in Penry, Justice
O'Connor confirmed that the common law protections for idiots and lunatics
are "well settled.
5 2
The protection for idiots in English common law carried over to the colo-
nies. Scholars note that "[m]ost of the colonial law as well as the colonists'
ways of thinking about idiocy originated in English common law and cus-
tom." 3 Moreover, as discussed in Part III, the prohibition on executing idiots
47. Id. at 407 (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (London, W.
Rawlins, 6th ed. 168o).
48. Id. (citing 3 COKE, supra note 47, at 6).
49. Id. Justice Marshall notes one aberration from this rule: Henry VIII enacted a law that re-
quired the execution of a man who committed treason, even if he fell mad. Id. at 408 n.1
(citing 33 Hen. VIII, c. 20). Justice Marshall notes that "[t]his law was uniformly con-
demned. The 'cruel and inhumane Law lived not long, but was repealed, for in that point al-
so it was against the Common Law . I...' d. (citations omitted) (quoting 3 COKE, supra
note 47, at 6) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *25; 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 35 (London, E. Rider 1736); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE
OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (London, G.G. & J. Robinson, 7 th ed. 1795)).
50. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407-08.
51. Id. at 408 (citing John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, in 11 T.B. How-
ELL, STATE TRIALS 474, 477 (London, T.C. Hansard 1811)).
52. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) ("It was well settled at common law that 'idiots,'
together with 'lunatics,' were not subject to punishment for criminal acts committed under
those incapacities.").
53. Parnel Wickham, Idiocy and the Law in Colonial New England, 39 MENTAL RETARDATION 104,
104 (2001) [hereinafter Wickham, Idiocy and the Law in Colonial New England]; see also Par-
nel Wickham, Idiocy in Virginia, 16i6-i86o, 80 BULL. HIST. MED. 677, 677 (2001) [hereinafter
Wickham, Idiocy in Virginia] ("The history of idiocy in America is firmly rooted in English
interpretations of and responses to the problem."). Even scholars who oppose special capital
protections for persons with intellectual disabilities concede the English and American
common law protections for idiots. See, e.g., Rumley, supra note 34, at 1305 ("The exculpa-
tion of 'idiots' from the death penalty has long been recognized and is now firmly ingrained
in English and American common-law jurisprudence. The inherent point of disagreement,
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was present in the primary legal resources upon which the Framers relied. Part
III argues that it was "cruel" to execute an idiot; however, as an alternative
originalist argument, one might also argue that it was "unusual" to do so.54
Although the latter argument appears to hold promise, this Note does not pur-
sue it.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE HISTORICAL ANALYSES IN PENRY AND
ATKINS
This Part critiques the Supreme Court's historical analyses in Penry and At-
kins, which concluded that insanity protections for idiots protected only those
who were "profoundly or severely mentally retarded." First, this Part shows
that these opinions relied heavily on sources that postdate the adoption of the
Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the Justices' definition of idiocy relied on
sources influenced by eugenic and phrenological models of intellectual disabil-
ity, both of which originated well after 1791. Second, when the Court did use
sources from the relevant period, those sources were not representative of the
treatment of idiocy at the time. The following critique aims to render explicit
the post-ratification assumptions about disability that were projected onto the
Eighth Amendment and to clear space for a new historical evaluation of idiocy
protections.
A. The Historical Findings of Ford, Penry, and Atkins
The Supreme Court has discussed common law insanity protections three
times: Ford v. Wainwright;ss Penry v. Lynaugh;,6 and Justice Scalia's dissent in
Atkins v. Virginia.7 As discussed below, Ford addressed common law insanity
protections generally and held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the exe-
cution of the insane. Penry and Justice Scalia's dissent in Atkins addressed
common law insanity protections for idiots in particular, and both opinions
claimed that idiocy protections extended only to those who were profoundly or
severely mentally retarded.
however, arises in the determination of what level of mental disability constitutes 'idiocy'
sufficient for exoneration from criminal responsibility.").
54. See Stinneford, supra note 8, at 1745 (showing that "unusual" meant "contrary to 'long us-
age' or 'immemorial usage'").
55. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
56. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
57. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In Ford v. Wainwright a divided Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of people who are insane." The defend-
ant, Alvin Bernard Ford, was convicted of the 1974 murder of a police officer
and was sentenced to death. 9 There was no indication that Ford was incompe-
tent at the time of the offense, the trial, or the sentencing; however, he subse-
quently began to display signs of mental illness, such as delusions and para-
noia. 6 o In 1984, the Governor of Florida decided to proceed with Ford's
execution after receiving conflicting reports on Ford's mental state.61 Ford's
counsel then unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas relief, seeking an evidentiary
hearing to determine Ford's sanity. 62 After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to "determine whether the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the execution of the insane and, if so, whether the District
Court should have held a hearing on petitioner's claim. '
6
,
As discussed in Part I.C, Justice Marshall surveyed the "impressive histori-
cal credentials" in the common law that prohibited the execution of the insane
and found that these protections were unwavering. Notably, Justice Marshall
did not attempt to discern who was included within the insanity protection: he
made no effort to delineate and distinguish the type or degree of mental in-
competence that would trigger the safeguards. Furthermore, Justice Marshall
did not distinguish between the common law's different classifications for
mental incompetence. Throughout his opinion, he interchangeably cites com-
mon law references to the insane, idiots, lunatics, the mad, and those of "non-
sane memory."6 ' In his concurrence, Justice Powell narrowed the holding by
defining the "insane" as only those who are so disabled that they cannot per-
ceive the connection between their crime and their punishment.6' This narrow
approach to insanity was subsequently adopted by most lower courts.6 6
58. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401 ("For centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the
insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the Constitution forbids the practice. To-
day we keep faith with our common-law heritage in holding that it does.").
59. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 526 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
60. Ford, 477 U.S. at 399.
61. Id. at 404.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 404-05.
64. Id. at 4o6-o8.
65. Id. at 422.
66. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 963
(9 th ed. 2012) (noting that most jurisdictions today define insanity for purposes of execu-
tion along the lines endorsed by Justice Powell).
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Three years later the Court addressed common law insanity protections
again in Penry v. Lynaugh.6 7 In Penty, the Court addressed a specific subset of
defendants who invoke the insanity defense: people with mental retardation.
In another divided decision, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does
not proscribe the execution of mentally retarded offenders but does require
that juries be permitted to consider mental retardation as a mitigating factor.68
Johnny Paul Penry, was convicted of, and sentenced to death for, the rape
and murder of Pamela Carpenter in 1979.69 At a competency hearing, a clinical
psychologist testified that Penry had organic brain damage and "had the men-
tal age of a 61/2 year-old, which means that 'he has the ability to learn and the
learning or the knowledge of the average 6 1/2 year old kid."'7° Penry's "social
maturity" was reported as that of a nine- or ten-year-old.7' Witnesses testified
that Penry was incapable of learning in school (he never completed the first
grade); he struggled for over a year to learn how to write his name; and he was
often beaten over the head as a child.7
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that historical pro-
tections exempted idiots from execution; however, she claimed that these pro-
tections extended only to people who were "profoundly or severely retarded"
and not to those who were moderately or mildly mentally retarded. 7 The his-
torical evidence for this claim is closely examined and contested in Part II.B.
While the central holding of Penry has since been overturned, this case remains
the Court's most definitive analysis of common law insanity protections for id-
iots. Notably, for purposes of this discussion, none of the dissenting Justices
provided a competing historical analysis.74
In 2002, the Supreme Court overruled Penry in Atkins v. Virginia and held
that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of mentally
retarded offenders.7' Daryl Atkins was convicted and sentenced to death for the
67. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
68. Id.
6g. Id. at 307, 310 (quoting pretrial competency hearing).
70. Id.at 3o7-o8.
71. Id. at 3o8.
72. Id. at 309.
73. Id. at 333.
74. In light of Justice Marshall's historical work only three years earlier in Ford, it is peculiar
that he did not challenge Justice O'Connor's historical narrative.
75. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) ("We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death pen-
alty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving stand-
ards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Con-
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abduction, robbery, and murder of Eric Nesbitt in 1996.76 During the penalty
phase, a forensic psychologist testified that Atkins had an IQof fifty-nine and
was "mildly mentally retarded," although the state's expert disputed this diag-
nosis.' In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens invoked the dissenting Justices
of the Virginia Supreme Court, who concluded that it was impermissible to ex-
ecute Atkins because he had a mental age between nine and twelve years. 78
The Court's reasoning relied entirely on the "evolving standards of decen-
cy" and did not mention historical idiocy protections. Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens argued that the recent trend among state legislatures to ban the
execution of mentally retarded offenders showed that the standards of decency
were evolving.79 Like Justice Marshall in Ford, Justice Stevens did not establish
who was considered mentally retarded for the purposes of capital punishment.
Instead, the Court left to the states "the task of developing appropriate ways to
enforce the constitutional restriction. ,8o
Justice Scalia's dissent in Atkins marks the last time the Supreme Court ad-
dressed common law insanity protections for idiots. Justice Scalia relied heavily
on the historical analysis in Penry, adding only three new sources."' In step
with Penry, he concluded that idiocy protections shielded only the "severely or
profoundly mentally retarded. ",s2 Justice Scalia chided the majority for bypassing
the original meaning approach and "making no pretense" that the execution of
Atkins "would have been considered 'cruel and unusual' in 1791." 8 3
These three cases comprise the entirety of the Court's analysis of common
law insanity protections for idiots and lunatics. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, these analyses - particularly from Penry and Atkins- are marked by seri-
ous historical flaws that render their findings unpersuasive.
stitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally
retarded offender." (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))).
76. Id. at 307.
77. Id. at 308-09.
78. Id. at 310 (citing Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000) ("[T]he imposi-
tion of the sentence of death upon a criminal defendant who has the mental age of a child
between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive...
79. Id. at 314-17.
80. Id. at 317.
81. Id. at 340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition to the sources in Penry, Justice Scalia added:
SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW ( 3d ed. 1985); ANTHONY
HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 2 (1822); and ISAAC RAY, A
TREATISE ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (Winfred Overholser ed., 1962).
8a. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
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B. Reliance on Disability Models That Postdate the Eighth Amendment
The primary problem with Penry's historical analysis is that it never directly
substantiates its central claim that idiocy protections were reserved for those
who were "severely or profoundly retarded." 4 This omission is somewhat ob-
scured by the semantics of idiocy. Penty's claim is supported by sources that in-
voke the term "idiot"; however, these sources contain narrower definitions of
idiocy that developed long after the adoption of the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, the sources on which the Court relies most heavily actually militate
against the "profound and severe" theory.
Penry makes the "profound and severe" claim three times. The first two
times have no citation to support the claim.8, Only in the third instance does
the Court provide a citation to support the "profound and severe" claim:
In its emphasis on a permanent, congenital mental deficiency, the old
common law notion of "idiocy" bears some similarity to the modern
definition of mental retardation. Ellis & Luckasson, supra, at 417. The
common law prohibition against punishing "idiots" generally applied,
however, to persons of such severe disability that they lacked the rea-
soning capacity to form criminal intent or to understand the difference
between good and evil. In the 19 th and early 20th centuries, the term
"idiot" was used to describe the most retarded of persons, correspond-
ing to what is called "profound" and "severe" retardation today. See
AAMR, Classification in Mental Retardation 179 (H. Grossman ed.
1983); id., at 9 ("idiots" generally had IQ of 25 or below) 8 6
This citation fails to support the Court's "profound and severe" claim for at
least three reasons. First, the central claim that idiocy applied only to the most
severely disabled is not supported by any pre-ratification source. Instead, the
Court cites the Classification in Mental Retardation by the American Association
on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) for the proposition that idiots correspond to
"profound and severe" retardation and that they "generally had an IQof 25 or
below."8" To provide some context: this characterization of idiocy protections,
if true, suggests that most people with Down syndrome were likely not pro-
84. Penry, 492 U.S. at 305, 333.
85. Id. at 308, 333.
86. Id. at 332-33.
87. Id. at 333 (citing the AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLAsSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETAR-
DATION 9 (Herbert H. Grossman ed., 1983)).
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881tected from execution. While the Court stops just short of saying that idiots
in 1791 had an IQof 25, this seems to be the implication. The problem with this
suggestion is that IQtests were not developed until the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. 8' The Court's careful wording ("In the 19 th and early 20th cen-
turies . . .") obscures the fact that the IQclassification system did not exist un-
til over a hundred years after the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. 90 This
twentieth-century classification does not accurately characterize idiocy protec-
tions in 1791.
Second, the AAMD manual actually militates against the "profound and se-
vere" theory. In fact, the AAMD states that the definition of idiocy did not
mean "profound and severe" until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.9
Prior to the nineteenth century-in the time period when the Eighth Amend-
ment was adopted-idiocy referred to "all retarded people."92 The AAMD
manual is not an historical treatise, but to the extent it discusses the history of
idiocy, it does not support the "profound and severe" theory.
Third, the cited IQclassification ("25 or below") actually pertains to the
AAMD's description of the eugenics movement in the twentieth century, not
the public understanding of idiocy in the eighteenth century. The AAMD sec-
88. Many people with Down syndrome have IQscores much higher than 25. See Facts and FAQ
About Down Syndrome, GLOBAL DOWN SYNDROME FOUND., http://www.globaldown
syndrome.org/about-down-syndrome/facts-about-down-syndrome [http://perma.cc/EYE9
-3RVT] (noting that 39.4 percent of people with Down syndrome have an IQin the range of
fifty to seventy). The average IQof people with Down syndrome is 5o. Mohammed Rachidi
& Carmela Lopes, Molecular and Cellular Mechanisms Elucidating Neurocognitive Basis of Func-
tional Impairments Associated With Intellectual Disability in Down Syndrome, 115 AM. J. ON IN-
TELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIEs 83, 84 (2010).
89. Corwin Boake, From the Binet-Simon to the Wechsler-Bellevue: Tracing the History of Intelli-
gence Testing, 24 J. CLINICAL &EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 383, 383-84 (2002).
go. For a similar criticism of the Court's anachronistic originalism, but with regard to the Se-
cond Amendment, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 198 (2008) ("[I]s there reason to favor popular views of the
[second] amendment one hundred years after its ratification? Either the evidence the major-
ity marshals to demonstrate that it was 'widely understood' that the Second Amendment
codified an individual right of self-defense accurately captures the understanding of those
who ratified the amendment in 1791, or the majority is presenting as the original public
meaning an understanding of the amendment that emerged in common law-like fashion in
the decades after the amendment was ratified.").
91. The AAMD defines the term "idiot" as follows: "idiot - an obsolete term used centuries ago
to describe all retarded persons and during the 19th and early 2oth century to describe per-
sons who would today be called profoundly or severely retarded." AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL
DEFICIENCY, supra note 87, at 179.
92. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 8 (noting that "(i]n [the sixteenth century] the term idiot
encompassed all levels of retardation").
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tion that contains the "IQof 25 or below" proposition describes a eugenic clas-
sification that consisted of "idiots," "imbeciles," and "morons." The section
says:
The end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century brought
two related movements, the development of intelligence tests and con-
cern for genetics as a factor in mental retardation .... The terms idiot,
imbecile, and moron were used to identify three levels of retarded behav-
ior, and approximate cut-off scores on intelligence tests were devised:
25, 50, and 75
.93
This IQ classification of mental impairment (25, So, and 75) was developed by
Henry Herbert Goddard, one of America's most prominent eugenicists. He in-
troduced the IQ classification -along with his neologism, "moron" 94 - in 191o
at an annual meeting of the American Association for the Study of the Feeble-
Minded. 9 The IQ scale was calibrated to a mental age range. "Idiots" referred
to those with a mental age up to two years; "imbeciles" had a mental age of
three to seven years; and "morons" had a mental age of eight to twelve years.
6
Goddard's classification system was part of a larger movement holding that
people with inferior genes needed to be found and controlled for society to
progress.97 Eugenic measures of control included the forced sterilization of
people with intellectual disabilities, marriage restrictions, and confinement. 9'
It is curious that the Court chose to cite Goddard's mental disability classi-
fication, particularly because numerous other classifications of idiocy existed
that were developed closer in time to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.99
93. Id. at 9.
94. Morons greatly worried Goddard. He said, "The idiot is not our greatest problem. He is in-
deed loathsome .... Nevertheless, he lives his life and is done. He does not continue the
race with a line of children like himself .... It is the moron type that makes for us our great
problem." S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 162 (1981).
9S. Report on Committee on Classification of Feeble-Minded, 15 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 61-67 (191w);
see also R.C. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION 139 (1983); Sheldon
H. White, Conceptual Foundations ofIQTesting, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 33, 37-38 (2000).
96. ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND TREAT-
MENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 355, 363 (2d ed. 1949).
97. See id. at 353.
98. See Ajitha Reddy, The Eugenic Origins of IQ Testing: Implications for Post-Atkins Litigation, 57
DEPAULL. REV. 667, 667 (2008).
99. See, for instance, Hervey Wilbur's four types of idiocy, which he developed in 1852: simula-
tive idiocy; higher-grade idiocy; lower-grade idiocy; and incurables. JAMES W. TRENT, JR.,
INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES
17 (1994). See also Kerlin's 1877 classification: "superior grades, who in five to ten years
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While the horrors of the eugenics movement hardly need recitation here, °° it
is worth noting that Goddard's views fell out of favor not only for normative
reasons; scholarly review of his work shows serious inadequacies in his scien-
tific method and professional ethics.' ° '
The eugenics movement is not as much a creature of the distant past as one
might imagine. When Penry was authored in 1989, the last explicit remnants of
the eugenic impulse were just subsiding. While most eugenic sterilization pro-
grams ended in the 196os, several states actively continued these programs into
the next decade.' 2 The Iowa Board of Eugenics approved involuntary steriliza-
tions of people with intellectual disabilities well into the 197os. °3 In 1976, the
North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the state's "compelling interest" to for-
cibly sterilize on the basis of "feeblemindedness, idiocy, or imbecility . . . to
protect the public and preserve the race from the known effects of the procrea-
tion of the mentally deficient children by the mentally deficient."'0 4 Even after
sterilization programs shed their explicitly eugenic skin, many of them contin-
ued into the 198os recast as efforts to protect incompetent persons.'
In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia incorporates Penry's "IQ of 25 or be-
low" standard to reaffirm a narrow definition of idiocy.10 6 However, his dissent
would be able to return to their communities; orphaned idiots and imbeciles; and lower
grades, who needed 'habit training, amusements, [and] exercise, aided by appropriate med-
ical treatment."' Id. at 80.
1o. For a history of the eugenics movement in the United States, see TRENT, supra note 99, at
131-83.
101. See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 94, at 165-71 (discrediting Goddard's scientific methodology by
showing his overuse of visual identification and his reliance on examiners' intuition; his
failure to test an unbiased sample; and Goddard's modification of photographs to create
physical features allegedly associated with mental disability).
io. Philip R. Reilly, Involuntary Sterilization in the United States: A Surgical Solution, 62 Q. REV.
BIOLOGY 153, 167 (1987) (noting that Iowa, North Carolina, and Oregon continued operat-
ing sterilization programs into the 1970s).
103. See, e.g., Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1979)
(discussing the involuntary sterilization of Robbin Howard in 1971 by the Iowa Board of
Eugenics). This case notes that the Iowa Board of Eugenics "approved 176 sterilizations in
the last five years." Id. at 293.
1o4. In re Moore's Sterilization, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (N.C. 1976).
io5. Reilly, supra note 102, at 167. This process exemplifies Reva Siegel's theory of "preservation-
through-transformation." See Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 1o5 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996) (describing how the dominant group in a legal hier-
archy may change its rhetoric over time to preserve the existing power structure); see also
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
io6. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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cites this IQ cutoff without any reference to the time period: "citing sources in-
dicating that idiots generally had an IQof 25 or below, which would place them
within the 'profound' or 'severe' range of mental retardation under modern
standards."'0 7 This explanation makes it difficult for the reader to recognize
that the lQjustification for the "profound and severe" theory did not emerge
until well after the adoption of the Eighth Amendment.
In addition to the eugenic influence, the Court's understanding of idiocy
relied on a phrenological model of disability-a model that also postdates the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment. In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia adds
a citation to Isaac Ray's work, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, which provides
Ray's account of the 1834 trial of an "imbecile."' , 8 Justice Scalia relies on this
source, among others, to maintain that the common law has always distin-
guished between different grades of mental retardation. He says:
Mentally retarded offenders with less severe impairments -those who
were not "idiots" -suffered criminal prosecution and punishment, in-
cluding capital punishment. See, e.g., I. Ray, Medical Jurisprudence of
Insanity 65, 87-92 (W. Overholser ed. 1962) (recounting the 1834 trial
and execution in Concord, New Hampshire, of an apparent "imbe-
cile" - imbecility being a less severe form of retardation which "differs
from idiocy in the circumstance that while in [the idiot] there is an ut-
ter destitution of every thing like reason, [imbeciles] possess some in-
tellectual capacity, though infinitely less than is possessed by the great
mass of mankind.").o9
This historical argument is unconvincing for several reasons. As a prelimi-
nary matter, the practice of grading idiocy was largely unknown in 1791. This
fact was stated in the AAMD Classification Manual cited in Penry"° (discussed
above) and is further corroborated by other scholarly sources."' To the extent
107. Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989)).
1os. Id. at 341 (quoting RAY, supra note 82, at 65, 87-92).
iog. Id. at 340-41.
11o. Penry, 492 U.S. at 302 (citing AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra note 87, at 179 (de-
fining an idiot as "an obsolete term used centuries ago to describe all retarded persons and
during the 19th and early 20th century to describe persons who would today be called pro-
foundly or severely retarded")); see also AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra, at 8 (not-
ing that in the sixteenth and seventeenth century "the term idiot encompassed all levels of
retardation").
wii. See, e.g., Jonathan Andrews, Begging the Question of Idiocy: The Definition and Socio-Cultural
Meaning of Idiocy in Early Modern Britain: Part i, 9 HIST. PSYCHIATRY 65, 93 (1998)
("[E]ighteenth-century medical commentators tended to conceive of idiocy in many ways
quite broadly. Indeed, a broad definition was encouraged by the fact that they rarely distin-
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that some legal commentators, such as Edward Coke, differentiated between
grades of idiocy, this differentiation generally did not impact criminal liabil-
ity.'12 While the law did distinguish between "weakness of understanding"
(that is, people who were simply unintelligent) and idiots, it generally did not
differentiate among different levels of idiocy. 113
Second, Ray was an ardent phrenologist, and he viewed mental compe-
tence through this idiosyncratic theoretical lens.114 The phrenological perspec-
tive of disability, however, was unknown to the Framers in 1791 because it had
not yet been invented.' Phrenology, the creation of German physicist Franz
Joseph Gall, was not well known in the United States until the 182os.16 As evi-
denced by law dictionaries from the 185os, the phrenological perspective of dis-
ability significantly altered the legal understanding of idiocy."7 The definitions
that emerged during this time included measurements of idiots' heads and
provided a peculiar list of character traits."'
Third, if Ray's views were actually representative of the public meaning of
idiocy in 1791, then many imbeciles would likely be protected by insanity pro-
tections. Ray classified "imbeciles" and "idiots" as subtypes of the category of
"insanity.""19 Because insanity was covered by common law protections, his
guished idiocy and its corollaries very thoroughly in terms of degree, or type."); Wickham,
Idiocy in Virginia, supra note 53, at 681 ("By the mid-18oos medical personnel introduced the
classification of'imbecile' to define a condition less impaired than idiocy.").
112. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, INSANITY ON TRIAL 9 (1988) (noting that although "Coke distin-
guished two types of 'idiocy' on the basis of severity... [a]s regarding crimes and culpabil-
ity ... this distinction would not lead to differing verdicts"). Matthew Hale distinguished
between "insanity" and "partial insanity." Id. at 9-1o. The former excused defendants in
criminal matters; the latter did not. Id. However, as discussed infra Part III.C, Hale's under-
standing of insanity was sufficiently broad that it is inapplicable to Justice Scalia's grading
claim.
113. Id.
114. Winfred Overholser, Editor's Introduction to RAY, supra note 81, at xi.
115. Ray's most influential work was not published until 1838. His work went on to deeply im-
pact nineteenth-century views of mental health, specifically through Howe and Kerlin.
TRENT, supra note 99, at 20.
116. Peter McCandless, Mesmerism and Phrenology in Antebellum Charleston: "Enough of the Mar-
vellous," 58 J. S. HIST. 199, 203-04 (1992).
117. See, e.g., JOHN BOUVIER, Idiocy, in 1 A LAw DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERI-
CAN UNION; WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAW 598 (7th
ed. 1857) (citing FRANZ JOSEF GALL, SUR LES FONCTIONS DU CERVEAU [ON THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE BRAIN] (Lewis Wilson trans., 1835), and describing measurements of idiots' heads).
118. Id.
119. RAY, supra note 82, at 60.
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taxonomy did not categorically exclude imbeciles from protection. Further-
more, Ray himself explicitly argued for the mitigation of criminal liability
based on imbecility: "To make such a person [an imbecile] responsible for his
actions to the same degree as one enjoying the full vigor and soundness of the
higher faculties is therefore manifestly unjust . ,, .o Other scholars, such as
Norman Finkel, note that Ray "gave wide exemption for insane offenders" and
viewed many criminal tests of sanity as "too narrow."'' Therefore, the fact that
an individual classified by Ray as an imbecile was tried and executed in 1834
does not clearly support a narrow interpretation of idiocy protections in 1791.
C. Sources That Predate the Eighth Amendment
When Penry and Atkins cite sources that predate the Eighth Amendment,
those sources are either inadequately quoted or from unrepresentative cases. In
supporting the "profound or severe" theory, Justice Scalia's dissent cites the
description of idiots from Anthony Fitzherbert's sixteenth-century work, Natu-
ra Brevium. Justice Scalia has good reason to cite Fitzherbert, whose description
of idiocy is one of the earliest and most frequently cited in the common law."
However, the dissent cites only the first sentence of Fitzherbert's two-sentence
description: "An idiot is 'such a person who cannot account or number twenty
pence, nor can tell who was his father or mother, nor how old he is, etc., so as
it may appear that he hath no understanding of reason what shall be for his
profit, or what for his loss.""123 According to this narrow definition, Justice
Scalia argues, an idiot must be so profoundly or severely disabled that he can-
not count to twenty or recognize his own parents. Consequently, only the most
severe cases of mental retardation would qualify a defendant for idiocy protec-
tions. As Justice O'Connor noted in Penry, this person would likely be covered
already by the insanity protections from Ford."4
While Fitzherbert's first sentence presents a narrow description of idiocy,
the second sentence provides more perspective: "But if he [the idiot] hath
[s]uch understanding, that he know and understand his letters, and do read by
120. Id. at 80.
121. FINKEL, supra note 112, at 19 ("Ray's position was that tests such as knowing right from
wrong, knowing the nature of the act, or even delusion, were all too narrow.").
122. S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw: A STUDY IN MEDICO-
SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE 124(1927) (describing Fitzherbert's work as one of the "mile-
stones on the road of the legal treatment of the subject of mental unsoundness").
123. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 ANTHONY
FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREviuM 233B (9 th ed. 1794)).
124. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-33 (1989).
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teaching or information of another man, then it [s]eemeth he is not a [s]ot nor
a natural idiot. '"s While the first sentence lays out one extreme boundary line
(those who cannot count to twenty or recognize their parents), the second sen-
tence points to the opposite boundary: those who learn to read and write seem
not to be idiots. Fitzherbert even softened the educability boundary with the
word "seemeth.11
26
Legal scholars confirm the importance of Fitzherbert's second sentence.
Sheldon Glueck-whom Justice O'Connor cites in Penry-notes that the first
sentence of Fitzherbert's definition cannot be read in isolation because
in the second portion of his definition, [Fitzherbert] modified the ex-
treme example put by him in the first part. There is certainly a wide gap
between the mental condition of the idiot who can not "number twenty
pence," or "tell who was his father or mother"; and of one who cannot
acquire the much more intricate accomplishment of understanding "his
letters," and reading.'27
Glueck further argues that Fitzherbert's definition was not meant to be a
bright-line idiocy test, nor was it understood that way. "From the second por-
tion of his definition, however, it seems clear that Fitzherbert, like his prede-
cessors and successors, did not intend his definition to be categorically exclu-
sive of any other means of determining a defendant's idiocy.128
Early legal commentators, such as Matthew Hale, did not abide by Justice
Scalia's narrow interpretation of Fitzherbert. Hale was one of the most influen-
tial jurists in English legal history.'29 Nigel Walker, in his landmark study
Crime and Insanity in England, appraises Hale's work as "[t] he clearest state-
ment of the law and its procedures at any single time in this period."'3 His
writings are particularly relevant for understanding the legal contours of idiocy
in the late eighteenth century. As Walker notes:
Unlike earlier writers, such as Coke... Hale devoted an entire chapter,
the fourth, to "the defects of ideocy, madness and lunacy in reference to
criminal offences and punishments." This chapter is not merely the
125. 2 ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM 533 (photo. reprint 2003) (9th ed. 1793).
126. Id.
127. GLUECK, supra note 122, at 128-29.
128. Id. at 128.
12. For an analysis of Hale's philosophy and his far-reaching impact, see Harold J. Berman, The
Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994).
130. 1 NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 35 (1968).
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most detailed description of seventeenth-century practice: after its be-
lated publication in 1736 it had more influence on lawyers of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth century than any other single work on the sub-
ject. 3'
Despite Hale's significant influence on legal conceptions of idiocy, the Court in
Penry and the dissent in Atkins give him only passing notice. 132
Hale's commentary on Fitzherbert further discredits Justice Scalia's inter-
pretation. After reciting Fitzherbert's test, Hale reflects on Fitzherbert's criteria,
noting that "[tlhese, tho they may be evidences, yet they are too narrow and
conclude not always; for ideocy or not is a question of fact triable by jury, and
sometimes by inspection." 33 This quotation is significant for two reasons.
First, Hale rejects the literal interpretation of Fitzherbert's description as too
narrow, thereby opening up space for a more flexible understanding of mental
incompetence. Second, Hale emphasizes that the determination of idiocy is a
fact-intensive procedure that must be individualized to the defendant. Subse-
quent legal scholars also endorsed Hale's interpretation of Fitzherbert's defini-
tion.3
4
In Penry, the Court also relied on the 1724 Trial of Edward Arnold to support
the "profound and severe" theory.' Edward Arnold pled insanity after he was
charged with attempting to murder Lord Onslow in the 1720S. 36 At the end of
the trial, Justice Tracy delivered jury instructions regarding the determination
of sanity, and these instructions have since come to be known as the "wild
beast test.' 37 The wild beast test states that "a man that is totally deprived of
his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more
131. Id. (quoting HALE, supra note 14, at 29).
132. Justice O'Connor quotes Hale only for the proposition that "a person who is deaf and mute
from birth 'is in presumption of law an ideot.'" Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 332 (1989)
(quoting IALE, supra note 14, at 34). Justice Scalia cites Hale only to support the unremark-
able claim that violent idiots could be "made wards of the state." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. HALE, supra note 14, at 29 (emphasis omitted).
134. See, e.g., GLUECK, supra note 127, at 128 ("[Fitzherbert] suggested it merely as one of the
convenient methods known to his day, of arriving at a judgment as to a person's fee-
blemindedness . . . ."); i WALKEP,, supra note 130, at 37 ("Hale implies that tests of this kind
[Fitzherbert's idiocy test] were relevant in criminal trials, but not conclusive.").
135. Penry, 492 U.S. at 332.
136. Rex v. Arnold, (1724) 16 St. Tr. 695 (Eng.).
137. DEUTSCH, supra note 96, at 392 ("In 1724, Judge Tracey laid down what was subsequently
known as the 'wild beast' test."); Nigel Walker, The Insanity Defense Before 18oo, 477 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 28 (1985).
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than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of
punishment. "13s
However, scholars maintain that the wild beast test was not representative
of insanity protections in the eighteenth century. 39 As Nigel Walker noted,
"The trials of Arnold and Ferrers have often been cited to demonstrate how
strictly the criteria of insanity were applied by criminal courts; but it is a
demonstration which assumes that these were typical cases. In fact they could
hardly have been less typical." 4 ° The trial was atypical primarily because Lord
Onslow portrayed Arnold's attack as an indirect attempt on the life of the
king- in other words, as attempted regicide. 4 Walker argues that Justice Tra-
cy "might well have been less hostile to Arnold if it had not been for the politi-
cal suspicions which Onslow had aroused." 42 This case's idiosyncrasy is fur-
ther corroborated by an acquittal that occurred a few years later with similar
facts but without the heightened political pressures. 43 Moreover, even though
Arnold was convicted and sentenced to death, his sentence was commuted to
imprisonment for life. '
It is also worth noting that Edward Arnold's defense was lunacy, not idio-
cy. In general, the insanity defense included both lunatics and idiots at the time
of Arnold's trial."5 However, Justice Tracy's jury instructions emphasized that
Arnold did not plead idiocy:
[A]nd it is observed they admit he was a lunatic and not an idiot. A
man that is an idiot, that is born so, never recovers, but a lunatic may,
138. Arnold, 16 How St. Tr. at 765.
139. See, e.g., FINKEL, supra note 112, at 16 (noting that Lord Erksine's successful insanity defense
of James Hadfield in 18oo would have "fallen on deaf ears if the jurors' views of insanity had
been consistent with the 'wild beast' test; fortunately for Hadfield, they were not. Erksine's
description of insanity must have fit more closely with the jurors' intuitive ideas about what
is and is not insane than the 'wild beast' test did").
140. 1 WALKER, supra note 130, at 53.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id. ("A few years later, in 1731, an Old Bailey jury were persuaded to return a special verdict
on evidence of insanity which was - to the modern eyes at least- no more impressive than in
Arnold's case.").
144. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 174 (2003).
145. ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS 92
(1981) (noting that the insanity plea was used to excuse idiots "until the end of the [eight-
eenth] century").
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and hath his intervals; and they admit he was a lunatic. You are to con-
sider what he was at this day, when he committed this fact. 46
By going out of his way to make this additional distinction, Justice Tracy's in-
structions were tailored to the intermittency and frenzied characteristics that
distinguished lunacy from idiocy at the time.1
47
To recap, this Part challenged the Supreme Court's historical analysis of in-
sanity protections for idiots. It showed that the Court's primary evidence for
the "profound and severe" theory relied on post-ratification sources. Those
sources are problematic because they employed theories of disability that did
not exist in 1791. When the Court did use sources from the relevant time peri-
od, they were not representative of the normal treatment of idiocy. The follow-
ing Part seeks to provide an alternative historical analysis of idiocy in English
and colonial common law.
III. REASSESSING INSANITY PROTECTIONS FOR IDIOTS
Part III reassesses the protections afforded to idiots at the end of the eight-
eenth century. It finds that notions of idiocy included a relatively wide range of
intellectual disabilities and were not limited to the "profoundly or severely re-
tarded." This Part first discusses the common law's general understanding of
idiocy. Throughout the common law, idiocy was usually defined by juxtaposi-
tion with lunacy; this Note follows that approach. The next two sections, Parts
III.B and C, discuss two different methods of identifying who was an idiot for
purposes of criminal liability: community reputation and the fourteen-year-old
rule. The community reputation approach stemmed from families and com-
munity members serving as the locus of care for idiots.' 8 Because community
members provided support for idiots, they were thought best suited to identify
who was an idiot. The fourteen-year-old rule -which prohibited the execution
of a person whose mental abilities were below those of an ordinary child of
fourteen years-was inherited from English common law. 49
146. WALKER, supra note 130, at 56 (citing Rex v. Arnold, (1724) 16 St. Tr. 695 (Eng.)).
147. See id. ("It is a mistake, however, to infer - as is often done - that the wild-beast test was
always, or indeed usually, interpreted as insisting on conduct of a spectacularly frenzied
kind. A whole century before Arnold's trial Dalton's CountreyJustice explains that if an 'idiot'
kills a man it is no felony 'for they have not knowledge of good or evil, nor can have feloni-
ous intent, nor a will or mind to do harm.").
148. See supra Part III.B. For a wide-ranging discussion of families and communities as caregiv-
ers, see THE Locus oF CARE: FAMILIES, COMMUNITIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE PROVISIONS
OF WELFARE SINCE ANTIQUITY (Peregrine Horden & Richard Smith eds., 1998).
149. See, e.g., HALE, supra note 14, at 30.
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This Part investigates both methods of identifying idiots. Both methods are
relevant, in part, because they may have been in tension at the time of the
adoption of the Eighth Amendment. As Langbein, Lerner, and Smith note,
American law underwent a "titanic struggle" at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury between "folk law" and "learned law."' Proponents of the folk law side
were "hostile to lawyers and legal doctrine" and believed that "[o] rdinary peo-
ple, applying common sense notions of right and wrong, could resolve the dis-
putes of life in localized and informal ways."' Those endorsing "learned law"
believed that "the intrinsic complexity of human affairs begets unavoidable
complexity in legal rules and procedures .... [and] insisted that law had to be,
in this special sense, learned."'' 2 The folk law sentiment aligns naturally with
the community reputation approach of determining idiocy; learned law aligns
with the doctrinal approach, the fourteen-year-old rule. Of these two impuls-
es - folk law and learned law - the latter ultimately prevailed. "In the end...
American law came to be learned law, a body of law so strongly patterned on
the learned English law that we still for many purposes think of the English
and American legal systems as comprising an inseparable entity called Anglo-
American law." ' 3 While this Part explores both ways of determining idiocy in
the eighteenth century, Part TV narrows its focus to the fourteen-year-old rule
for modern application.
A few qualifying comments are necessary at the outset. First, as a baseline
matter, we know relatively little about criminal justice in the colonies. As Law-
rence Friedman said, "The colonial world is not easy to capture in a few short
pages, and its criminal justice system is no less elusive. The further we go back
in time, the dimmer the world gets, and the stranger.' 5 4 In their casebook,
Langbein, Lerner, and Smith likewise acknowledge that "little is known about
the conduct of criminal prosecutions in colonial America . . . ."'I' Second, the
colonies were not homogenous; they varied across geographical regions. For
instance, the northern Puritan colonies sanctioned morality offenses quite se-
verely, but handled property offenses more leniently; the southern colonies op-
erated inversely., 6 And of course, the colonies also varied over time. Friedman




154. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 21.
155. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 734; see also id. at 738 ("Although there is now an extensive
understanding of the conduct of criminal jury trials in seventeenth- and eighteenth century
England, little is known about criminal trials in colonial America.").
156. Id. at 740-41.
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comments that "[i]t is convenient to talk about the colonial years as a single
'period.' Yet this period lasted about 150 years, a span of many generations;
people were born, grew old, died, were forgotten, all within this single 'peri-
od.'""I' This variation complicates any sweeping generalizations regarding idio-
cy in the colonies.
Third, few historians focus on mental impairments in colonial America,
and even fewer focus specifically on idiocy."'s Parnel Wickham suggests two
reasons for this disregard: "[I]diocy has been neglected in studies of the Amer-
ican colonies partly because of the paucity of documentation and partly because
of the disinterest of scholars."' 9 Regarding the first reason, primary sources
relating to idiocy are particularly scarce before the institutionalization move-
ment in the nineteenth century.6 In eighteenth-century England, and to an
even greater extent in the colonies, there are few records of how idiots were
treated in criminal matters. In the colonies, records are scarce partly because
idiots were often dealt with outside of formal legal proceedings.161 This extra-
judicial treatment- combined with the general lack of case reporting in the
eighteenth century6' -resulted in few surviving records of idiots at trial. 
63
Wickham's second reason-a lack of interest on the part of scholars-also rings
true. Patrick McDonagh characterizes academia's approach toward idiocy as
15. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 22.
158. See Wickham, Idiocy in Virginia, supra note 53, at 679 ("The problem of idiocy in America
has received little attention from historians."). Parnel Wickham has written a series of arti-
cles on idiocy in colonial America that are cited throughout this Note. See also KIM E. NIEL-
SEN, A DISABILITY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 12-48 (2012); SCHEERENBERGER, supra
note 95, at 91-107.
159. Parnel Wickham, Conceptions of Idiocy in Colonial Massachusetts, 35 J. Soc. HIST. 935, 935
(2002).
16o. Id.; cf Parnel Wickham, Images of Idiocy in Puritan New England, 39 MENTAL RETARDATION
147, 147 (2001) ("Historical research on mental retardation in the United States tends to fo-
cus on the institutional heritage that began in the early 18oos and continues into the pre-
sent.").
161. See, e.g., Wickham, supra note 159, at 939-40 (noting that idiots may have been "dismissed
by the court before their trials began"); see also DANA Y. RABIN, IDENTITY, CRIME, AND LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 104 (2004) ("Legal authorities often
settled cases involving idiocy without a trial.").
162. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 825 ("In colonial America 'the reporting of an decision was
unusual,' and this state of affairs lasted well into the early national period. When Kent as-
cended the bench in 1798, there existed only a few volumes of American law reports."). See
generally, id. at 824-38 (describing the rise of official reports in the nineteenth century).
163. EDGAR J. McMANuS, LAw AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
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one of "strenuous neglect.', 6, C.F. Goodey observes that "[n]o honour accrues
to the academy from natural and incurable idiocy.", 6, Whatever the cause, the
story of idiocy in colonial times is largely untold.
These prefatory points are meant to acknowledge this Note's limits. The
evidentiary record is sparse; moreover, all historical generalizations, to some
extent, sacrifice degrees of accuracy for increased intelligibility. As Friedman
states with a mix of hope and frustration, "There was an overall pattern [in the
colonies], which we can clearly see today; but the patterns dissolve the closer
one gets-or the more carefully one looks at details.' 66 Despite these limita-
tions, the available resources- such as colonial statutes, legal treaties, legal dic-
tionaries, newspapers, and trials in England-point to certain trends and gen-
eralizations that this Part seeks to synthesize.
A. Idiocy, Lunacy, and the Range of Intellectual Disabilities
The history of idiocy is inseparably paired with the history of lunacy. In
fact, when idiocy is discussed at all, it is generally mentioned as a corollary to
the primary subject of lunacy. The coupling of idiocy and lunacy is not a new
phenomenon; its roots reach deep into the development of the two concepts. 67
Since the thirteenth century, idiocy and lunacy were consistently coupled and
juxtaposed.16 This interplay continued throughout the English common law
and carried over to the North American colonies. 69 While theoretical exposi-
tions consistently distinguish between idiocy and lunacy,17 the distinction of-
ten did not hold in practice. Because idiots and lunatics were often subsumed
into the large category of "paupers," there are numerous instances of their con-
164. McDONAGH, supra note 16, at 8.
165. C. F. Goodey, The Psychopolitics of Learning and Disability in Seventeenth-Century Thought, in
FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PEOPLE WITH LEARNING
DISABILITIES 95 (David Wright & Anne Digby eds., 1996).
166. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 22.
167. See, e.g., Jonathan Andrews, Identifing and Providing for the Mentally Disabled in Early Mod-
ern London, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra note 165, at 65, 72 ("Too often
[idiocy] has been treated as a social and medical issue virtually synonymous with that of lu-
nacy, or dealt with as a subordinate corollary to madness, rather than as a subject in itself.");
Anne Digby, Contexts and Perspectives, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra, at 1, 7
("Medical interest was much greater in lunacy than in idiocy and imbecility.").
168. Digby, supra note 167, at 2 ("From the thirteenth century onwards there had been a legal
dichotomy between idiocy and lunacy.").
169. See Wickham, Idiocy and the Law in Colonial New England, supra note 53, at io6.
170. Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy-The Old Law and Its Incubus, 18 U. CH-I. L. REv. 361, 362
(1951).
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flation. 171 When this distinction was made in practice, there is little evidence
regarding how it was made.'72
The primarily theoretical difference between idiocy and lunacy was the
permanence of idiocy as contrasted with the intermittency of lunacy.' 73 Other
important characteristics of idiocy included: heightened dependence on oth-
ers,174 ineducability, 75 a lack of normalcy 16 or maturity,' 77 and sometimes idio-
cy's congenital origins'78 and accompanying physical abnormalities.' 79 Lunacy,
however, was marked by its intermittent periods of "madness." These periods
171. See, e.g., DEUTSCH, supra note 96, at 116; STANLEY HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RE-
TARDED PEOPLE 9 (1983) ("Despite long-standing distinctions between idiocy and lunacy,
the conditions were often confused. Under categories such as lunacy, madness, or insanity
people perceived as mentally retarded or mentally ill were often lumped together.");
SCHEERENBERGER, supra note 95, at 94. The grouping of diverse marginalized people under
the label of "paupers" continued well into the nineteenth century.
172. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 167, at 6S, 72 ("Despite the evident existence and operation of
significant criteria distinguishing certain 'idiotic' and 'foolish' types of mental abnormality
from other 'lunatic' types, the fact remains that parish records tell us very little about how
the distinctions rooted in such terminology were arrived at.").
173. Comment, supra note 170, at 361-62; Digby, supra note 167, at 7 ("Until the late nineteenth
century there existed at best only a blunted perception of the difference between the imbecil-
ic and the harmless or chronic lunatic, or between the congenitally handicapped and the se-
nile demented.").
174. See, e.g., Peter Rushton, Idiocy, the Family and the Community in Early Modern North-East
England, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra note 165, at 51 (noting that idiocy
tests focused on "socially necessary skills of numeracy and everyday language use").
175. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 130, at 36 (describing early tests, such as Fitzherbert's, that
gauged numeracy and literacy).
176. The category of idiocy sometimes included those simply branded as socially deviant. For
instance, up until the nineteenth century those convicted of bestiality were described as "idi-
ots." SmiTH, supra note 145, at 93.
177. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 137, at 28 ("An almost adult knowledge of worldly matters
seems to have been the criterion.").
178. There are notable exceptions to the congenital characteristic of idiocy. For instance, while
Hale, like Coke, did not allow "induced witlessness," (that is, drunkenness) to excuse, he
did carve out an exception for cases when heavy drinking caused "an habitual or fixed
phrenzy." WALKER, supra note 13o, at 39. As Nigel Walker points out, this principle
"saved[d] several Victorian alcoholics from the gallows." Id.; see also Andrews, supra note
167, at 70 ("Early modern writers made little distinction between idiocy and chronically
progressed conditions of mental enfeeblement. Identification of a number of elderly parish-
ioners as 'foolish', or 'idiotic', in metropolitan parish records also suggests the importance of
this conflation.").
179. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 167, at 70 (noting that idiots may be recognized by "odd phys-
ical appearance, especially the size of their heads, deformities, or enlargement in their fea-
tures, and vacuousness in their expressions").
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were compared to the permanent mental state of an idiot; however, there was
often a heightened emphasis on the lunatic's "phrenzy. '' ,s If lunacy became
permanent - as in cases of "chronic lunacy" - hardly any distinction remained
between lunacy and idiocy. 1,s
Many of the earliest examples of the idiocy/lunacy distinction originate in
property law. In the thirteenth century, pursuant to the Prerogativa Regis, the
King had the right and duty to take the land of subjects who could not manage
their property. 82 The Crown exercised this right by seizing an idiot's inherited
land, providing him with his "necessaries," and then transferring the land to
his heirs upon his death. 83 The practice was largely similar for lunatics; how-
ever, since their insanity was intermittent, the King only assumed custody of
their land and diverted the profits to the lunatic.' 84 Because the financial rami-
fications for a finding of idiocy were so much harsher than for a finding of lu-
nacy, Blackstone notes that jurors sometimes found a landowning idiot to be a
lunatic just to ensure that he received the profits of his land. 8s This general
structure carried over to the North American colonies, and most surviving idio-
cy cases from the colonies revolved around property disputes.'86
Eighteenth-century colonial newspapers show that the general public was
familiar with the property laws for idiots and lunatics. For instance, the Penn-
sylvania Gazette in 1773 reported a case where a fraudster married a wealthy "id-
iot" woman, apparently as part of a scheme to acquire her property.'8 7 In the
article, the authors petitioned the colonial assembly to grant relief "in the same
18o. WALKER, supra note 13o, at 28 (noting that early insanity cases for the mentally ill used
terms such as "furiousus" and "frenetico passione detentus" whereas idiocy was described
with a term like "fatuitas"); see also Walker, supra note 137, at 28 (noting that the conduct of
idiots was not expected to be frenzied).
181. Andrews, supra note 167, at 70 ("Early modern writers made little distinction between idiocy
and chronically progressed conditions of mental enfeeblement.").
182. The earliest copies of the Prerogativa Regis date back to the second half of the thirteenth cen-
tury and announce the rights and duties of the king. Richard Neugebauer, Mental Handicap
in Medieval England, in FROM IDIOCY TO MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra note 165, at 22, 24-25.
183. Id. at 25.
184. Id. at 26-27.
18s. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at *303 (noting that juries often determined a landowner to be
non compos mentis more generally, and not an idiot specifically, in order to protect the land-
owner's estate).
186. For instance, a Westlaw search for any of these terms-sanity, insan!, idiot!, ideot!, idiocy,
lunatic!, lunacy, madman, compos, "non sane memorie" -before 1795 provided thirty-six
results. Excluding false positives, all but four of these cases involved property disputes.
187. PA. GAZETTE, no. 2309, Mar. 24, 1773, at 4.
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manner as a Committee of Lunaticks might or could do in England. ",,ss Other
late-eighteenth-century newspaper accounts included jokes about idiots, sq
speculation about their chances in the afterlife,'"0 and scandalous or lurid sto-
ries.' 9'
The distinction between idiocy and lunacy also existed in criminal law.
Since idiocy was generally considered congenital and permanent, an idiot was
protected from punishment throughout life. However, since lunacy was inter-
mittent, these cases required additional investigation to determine whether the
defendant acted under such a disability. 92 The idiocy/lunacy distinction may
have been relevant because of heightened concern that defendants would feign
lunacy. Because idiocy was congenital, and community members could testify
to this fact, it was much more difficult to fake.193
The general public was also aware of the criminal protections afforded idi-
ots and lunatics. In 1788, Philadelphia's Independent Gazetteer reported a case of
a man with "deranged understanding" who attacked people on several different
occasions, broke windows, and spit in the face of a judge; however, he was
consistently remanded to hospitals instead of criminally prosecuted.'94 Many
colonial newspapers closely covered the 1786 acquittal of Margaret Nicholson,
188. Id.
i8g. See, e.g., MASS. CENTINEL, no. 43, Aug. 17, 1785, at 2 ("How shameful is it that you should
fall asleep (said a dull preacher to his drowsy audience) when the poor creature (pointing to
an idiot who was leaning on a staff and staring at him) is both awake and attentive. Perhaps,
Sir, replied the fool, I should have been asleep to [sic], if I had not been an idiot.").
19o. For instance, in 1771 a Boston newspaper jocularly discussed an "idiot, approaching so near
the bestial kind, that 'twould be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish him from the
beast, were he not covered with a human body .... "Bos. EVENING POST, no. 1870, July 29,
1771, at 3. The author goes on to ask, "What will become of him at death? Will his spirit go
down to the earth with the beast, or upwards with the man? Is he to be looked on as an in-
fant, or adult? ... Will he receive reward or punishment? Who can judge in this case, but
the Great Judge of quick and dead?" Id.
191. CITY GAZETrE OR DAILY ADVERTISER, no. 983, June 27, 1788, at 2-3 (recounting a story from
England wherein an idiot exhumed the corpse of his mother and covered her body in hemp
"some of which was tied around her head").
192. See, e.g., I WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (Garland Publishing,
Inc. 1978) (1716). ("[I]f it be doubtful whether a Criminal, who at his Trial is in appearance
a Lunatick, be [s]uch in Truth or not, it [s]hall be tried by an Inque[s]t of Office, to be re-
turned by the Sheriff of the County wherein the Court [s]its; and if it be found by them that
the Party only feigns him[s]elf mad, and he [s]till refu[s]e to an[s]wer, he [s]hall be dealt
with as one who [s]tands mute."),
193. RABIN, supra note 161, at 104 (noting that "[j]uries considered evidence of idiocy more cred-
ible than evidence of lunacy").
194. See INDEP. GAZETTEER; OR, CHRON. FREEDOM, no. 716, Mar. 29, 1788, at 3.
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a non compos mentis woman who made an attempt on the life of King George
III. ' In 1789, Boston's Herald of Freedom relayed an account from London in
which seventeen-year-old Eleanor Johnson committed suicide.9 6 The paper
reported that "an intimacy had fulfilled between the deceased and a black man,
named Thomas Cato, a native of the East Indies, on whom she had fixed her
affection .... After Cato "accused her of deceit," Johnson poisoned her-
self.l"' The report goes on: "When examined before the Jury, the Black ap-
peared so ignorant and illiterate, that nothing could be collected from his evi-
dence .... The Jury, after a very humane and attentive consideration, brought
in their verdict, LUNACY."' 99 These accounts show that the general colonial
population was aware of idiocy protections and their English origins.
There appear to be fewer idiocy criminal cases than lunacy criminal cases.
Some speculate that this difference is due to a lower incidence of crime in the
demographic of idiots. °0 Others note that idiots were more likely to be acquit-
ted extrajudicially.2"1 Because idiots were known by their communities as such,
when they committed crimes, they were often remanded to an almshouse, hos-
pital, jail, or the custody of their families.2 "2 As a general matter, it seems there
was less penological interest in idiots than in lunatics. Idiots were largely
viewed as followers who were easily persuaded by others into criminality;
however, they were also easily apprehended. 3
195. See, e.g., AM. RECORDER. AND CHARLESTOWN ADVERTISER, no. 76, Sept. 29, 1786, at 2-3;
CARLISLE GAZETTE AND W. REPOSITORY KNOWLEDGE, No. 66, Nov. 8, 1786, at 2; PROVI-
DENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRYJ., No. 1194, Nov. 18, 1786, at 2.




2oo. See, e.g., Wickham, Idiocy in Virginia, supra note 53, at 681. ("While the surviving reports of
lunacy [in criminal cases] are limited, there are even fewer of idiocy-probably because at-
tention was directed more often toward lunatics.").
201. See, e.g., Wickham, supra note 159, at 939-40 (noting that idiots may have been "dismissed
by the court before their trials began").
2o2. See, e.g., NIELSEN, supra note 158, at 37-38; see also Wickham, Idiocy in Virginia, supra note 53,
at 691 (noting that a criminal offender was in "a State of entire ideoty" and "uncapable of
knowing right from wrong" so she was "taken from jail and 'forwarded to the hospital in
Williamsburg, according to the law'"). Family confinement may have been a longstanding
practice. See WALKER, supra note 130, at 26 ("I suggest that the pre-Norman practice in deal-
ing with serious offenses by the insane, such as homicide, was to make the offender's family
pay and look after him, and that this was done without presenting him formally for trial: lo-
cal knowledge of insanity settled the matter without the necessity for that.").
2o3. TRENT, supra note 99, at 12. It seems that idiots garnered less attention than lunatics, not
just in criminal law, but as a general matter as well. Andrews, supra note 167, at 67 ("There
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In the colonies, idiots "blended into the general population unless they
were apprehended for criminal behavior, and if the surviving records are any
indication, few were brought before the courts." 4 Nonetheless, many colo-
nies, similar to England, enacted statutes that explicitly exempted idiots from
criminal punishment. For instance, the Colony of Rhode Island adopted a bur-
glary provision holding that one who "in the night time do breake and enter
into a Dwelling house with an intent to robb" is punished under a "Felonie of
Death."2"5 However, the provision "extends not to . . . fooles, nor to madd
men. " "26 The terms "fool" and "natural fool" were common synonyms of the
word "idiot" in the eighteenth century.2 °7 Other colonies enacted similar stat-
utes protecting idiots from criminal punishment.o 8 In addition, idiots and lu-
natics who committed suicide were not counted asfelo de se (which was a prop-
erty sanction levied against the estates of those who committed suicide).20 9
B. Identifying Idiots: Community Reputation
There are several hurdles in identifying the characteristics of eighteenth-
century idiots. The colonial criminal statutes make no effort to explain who
qualified for these protections.210 Other legal sources offer similarly scant de-
is no escaping the fact that contemporaries spent more time, more money and more energy
on providing for and writing about those deemed to be lunatics than on the merely idiot-
ic.").
204. Wickham, Idiocy in Virginia, supra note 53, at 681.
205. Wickham, Idiocy and the Law in Colonial New England, supra note 53, at 107.
2o6. Id.
2o7. See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775) (defining an idiot as,
"A fool; a natural; a changeling; one without the powers of reason); Wickham, supra note
16o, at 148 (noting the appearance of "terms such as incapashous, simplish, and natural fool"
in colonial records).
208. McMANUS, supra note 163, at 104 (discussing statutory protections for idiots in the colonies
of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island).
209. HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL COURT OF COLONIAL VIR-
GINIA 70 (1965) ("A suicide adjudged non compos mentis, or insane, was not subject to the
penalties of the law."). After suicides, coroners performed an inquest to investigate the
death. There are numerous colonial newspapers that report their findings of "insanity." See,
e.g., ST. GAZETTE S.C., no. 2403, May 18, 1786, at 3 (reporting on the suicide of James Storie,
and noting that the coroner found him "insane, and not of sound mind, memory, and per-
fect understanding").
210. McMANUS, supra note 163, at 104 ("Massachusetts granted idiots and distracted persons
statutory exemption from prosecution, but unfortunately provided no guidelines for identi-
fying such persons. The Connecticut statute was equally vague .... Rhode Island's burglary
2780
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scription. For instance, a review of law student notebooks from the colonies
show that these criminal protections existed, but it does not explain the legal
standard by which idiocy was determined." However, the historical record is
clear about one identifying factor: the probative role of an idiot's reputation in
her community.
Before the wave of institutionalization that swept England and the United
States in the nineteenth century, idiocy was addressed on a local level by the
idiot's family and community. 2 Since the community - not medical experts -
was the locus of care for idiots, community members were the ones called on to
testify at trials. Nigel Walker explains that the earliest insanity cases relied en-
tirely on local knowledge: "Being local men, they knew-or thought they
knew-who was born when and who was a lunatic or an idiot."1 3 The "popular
reputation" approach carried on throughout the eighteenth century and, to a
lesser extent, into the nineteenth.214 While many legal tests -such as Fitzher-
statute exempted 'fools and madmen' from capital punishment, though the extent to which
a burglar had to be foolish or mad was not clear.").
211. My review of the digitized Litchfield Law School student notebooks reveals that idiocy and
lunacy shielded defendants from punishment; however, the notebooks provide little expla-
nation of how idiocy or lunacy should be determined. See, e.g., 3 Lonson Nash, Lectures on
Various Legal Subjects Delivered in the Litchfield Law School 1392 (1803) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School Library, Manuscript HLS MS 4oo4), http://
pds.lib.harvard.edu/pds/view/4o129255?n=44 3 [http://perma.ccP393-MADA] ("Idiots and
lunaticks are not punishable for a crime, because they have no will .... If the fact whether
he is insane is doubtful, it must be determined by a Jury.").
212. TRENT, supra note 99, at 7 (noting that idiots in the colonies received care from their ex-
tended families); see also SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CrrY 1674-
1784, at 68 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1935) (providing an example of a case from May lo, 172o,
where the Church Wardens were ordered to pay Mr. John Moore "four Shillings Weekly to
be by him laid out and Applyed to the use of Mrs. Phillipina Schelleux Widdow (who is non
Compos Mentis) towards her support and Maintainance She being an Object of Charity").
213. Walker, supra note 137, at 28.
214. Digby, supra note 167, at 2 (noting that "[l]egal decisions often effectively validated the
viewpoint of families or endorsed the popular reputation of the individual as an idiot");
Rushton, supra note 174, at 52 ("The use of friends and neighbors as witnesses suggests that
a general popular reputation [of idiocy] was taken as evidence in many instances."); Walker,
supra note 137, at 30 ("Usually it was not medical evidence but the testimony of relatives,
friends, or spectators that persuaded the court that the defendant had been mad at the time
of his crime. If medical testimony was available, it was associated with a higher probability
of a favorable verdict-but only a little higher."); see also id. ("On these occasions, as in alle-
gations of lunacy, the everyday knowledge of normal mental states was thought sufficient to
diagnose the abnormal, suggesting that, as Neugebauer notes, those manifesting these
signs, to the popular mind, 'lived next door' and were part of ordinary acquaintance. The
use of friends and neighbors as witnesses suggests that a general popular reputation was
taken as evidence in many instances.").
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bert's - contained seemingly rigid language, there is little evidence that they
were implemented in such an unforgiving manner." When they were, it was
either because the crime created a fierce political response, 6 or, in civil cases,
when a powerful person wanted to dispossess another of his property.1 7
Reports from the Old Bailey Courthouse in London provide illustrative ex-
amples of the community's probative role in eighteenth-century idiocy trials in
England.21S In 1767, Samuel Straham was indicted for bigamy because he mar-
ried a second wife. 9 After Straham plead idiocy, the court heard testimony of
witnesses who knew Straham. One said, "I have known [Straham] for sixteen
215. Also note, as discussed supra in Part II.C, that Fitzherbert's language was not nearly as rigid
as indicated by Justice Scalia in Atkins.
216. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 130, at 57.
217. These cases bent the idiocy classification in both directions. In some instances, a prominent
person took advantage of an idiot and bought his land for a fraction of its worth. When the
family of the idiot protested that the idiot was incompetent to make such a transaction, the
prominent person sought to quash the finding of idiocy. See, e.g., DEUTSCH, supra note 96,
at 59 (noting that Benjamin Franklin expressed concern for insane people who were taken
advantage of by "ill disposed Persons").
Alternatively, the definition of idiocy was stretched to include people who were capable
of managing their affairs in order to allow the Crown to seize their land. Take, for instance,
the case of Henry Roberts in 1747. Anonymous, The Case of Henry Roberts, Esq, in PATTERNS
OF MADNESS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A READER 101-O6 (Allan Ingram ed., 1998).
Roberts was orphaned when he was young, and he inherited an estate from his parents. The
estate was managed by trustees until Roberts came of age in 1739. At that time, in order to
evade charges of mismanagement, his trustees initiated a "commission of idiocy" against
him, which is described by the anonymous author in detail. The author describes the "very
rough and hasty [m]anner" in which the vested inquisitors challenged Roberts, id. at 102,
asking him questions "without giving [him t]ime to answer," id. at 104. During the hearing
Roberts demonstrated that he knew the value of different coins, could perform basic arith-
metic, and even write. Id. at 102. However, a witness testified that at a prior date Roberts
could not answer "where the Soul went when it separated from the Body," and that he
therefore must be an idiot. Id. at 103 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the inquisitors quickly
asked him questions such as "what a Lamb, and what a Calf was called at one, two and three
Years old." Id. at 104 (emphasis omitted). After miscounting a sum of money, the inquisitors
determined that he was incapable of managing his affairs. Id. The inquisition of idiocy end-
ed with Roberts being declared incapable and stripped of his estate. Id. at ioi.
218. First published in 1674, the Proceedings of The Old Bailey publicized accounts of the
trials at the Old Bailey Courthouse in London. Today it is a free resource that provides an
electronically searchable database for researchers. OLD BAILEY ONLINE (2015), http://www
.oldbaileyonline.org [http://perma.cc/BV6C-X47R]. Unfortunately, no similar resource ex-
ists for trials in the colonies.
219. Samuel Straham, Sexual Offences > Bigamy, 23rd February 1757, PROC. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S
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years . . . [and] count him no better than an ideot." 0 Another said that he
"always took [Straham] to be a fool" and that he "does not know right from
wrong." Following this testimony, he was acquitted. 1 In 1762, Ann Wildman
was indicted for stealing.' Several witnesses "who had known [Wildman]
some years" testified to her idiocy. =3 They said "she was a very weak, easy,
foolish girl, next a kin to an idiot."' Without mention of any formal tests, this
evidence was sufficient to acquit Wildman as an idiot.' s Many other acquittal
cases exist; likewise, they often make little effort to explain why the defendant
was considered an idiot. 
6
The Old Bailey accounts also contain instances where community witnesses
were insufficient to secure an idiocy acquittal. For example, in 1748, Robert
Miller was found guilty of stealing a linen handkerchief. 1 7 Community wit-
nesses came forward to testify on Robert's behalf, including his employer and
his brother Richard. Robert's employer described him as one "troubled with
fits" and "half an ideot."" 9 Richard reported that he "maintained [Robert for]
six or seven years" and that "[h]e has been under most of the doctors [sic]
hands in London.""23 There is no explanation of the court's reasoning, but




222. Ann Wildman, Theft > Grand Larceny, 14th January 1762, PROC. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S
CENT. CRIM. CT., 1674 TO 1913 (1762), http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id




226. See, for instance, the case of Mary Tame in 1719. Tame was indicted for drowning her sister
in a pond. However, "it appeared by the Evidence that the Prisoner was an Ideot," and she
was acquitted. No further information is provided regarding how the jury reached this con-
clusion. Mary Tame, Killing > Murder, 3rd September 1719, PROC. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S
CENT. CRIM. CT., 1674 TO 1913 (1719), http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id
=t1719o9o3-33&div=t1719o9o3-33 [http://perma.cc/V3F6-HVU2].
227. Robert Miller, Theft > Grand Larceny, 26th May 1748, PROC. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S





231. Old Bailey Proceedings Punishment Summary, 26th May 1748, PROC. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S
CENT. CRIM. CT., 1674 TO 1913 (1748), http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp
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Although idiocy defenses sometimes failed, Nigel Walker's broader analysis
of the Old Bailey Sessions Papers confirms a significant statistical increase in
insanity acquittals in the second half of the eighteenth century. 32 He says that
the insanity defense "often succeeded in the eighteenth century . .. [and]
[1]aymen's evidence was often accepted without any testimony by mad-
doctors." 3 After ruling out alternative explanations, Walker says that "[s]ince
we cannot dismiss the [statistical increase] as a result of chance or improve-
ments in procedure, we must look for signs of genuine changes either in the
pattern of crime or in attitudes to mental disorder." 34 And while he acknowl-
edges the possibility of "an increase in the relative frequency with which luna-
tics and idiots appeared in the docket at the Old Bailey" he insists that "an un-
mistakable phenomenon of this period was a growing public awareness of the
special nature of the social problem posed by the mentally disordered." 3'
Insanity acquittals for idiots and lunatics also occurred in the colonies;
however, as noted above, idiots and lunatics were particularly unlikely to re-
ceive formal trials.3 6 Furthermore, the available trial records are often quite
terse. Like the colonial statutes, colonial courts seem to rely on the assumption
that idiots and lunatics would simply be known as such. This is consonant with
general historical assessments of colonial trials, specifically, that colonial juries
often decided both questions of law and fact. 3 For instance, a judge charging a
?div=sx748o526-I [http://perma.cc/V6zL-6YES]. Transportation was a punishment
whereby the convicted was sent abroad to do hard labor. Punishments at the Old
Bailey, OLD BATLEY ONLINE (2015), http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Punishment.jsp
#transportation [http://perma.cc/6RRQ-UZRS]("In 1718 the first Transportation Act al-
lowed the courts to sentence felons guilty of offences subject to benefit of clergy to seven
years transportation to America.").
232. WALKER, supra note 13o, at 68 (describing "the increases in frequency and success rate [of
insanity defenses] just after the middle of the [eighteenth] century").
233. Walker, supra note 137, at 25.
234. WALKER, supra note 130, at 70.
235. Id. Walker notes that even attacks on the king were liable to be dismissed based on the in-
sanity defense. "By 1786, the climate of opinion was such that Margaret Nicholson ... who
attacked George III ... was not even arraigned, but simply consigned to Bethlem." Id. at
223. Again in 179o an insane person attacked the king. After John Frith was charged with
high treason, he was adjudged insane and the matter was remanded. The record states that
he was "remanded for the present." However, there is no historical evidence indicating that
he went back to trial or was executed. Id. at 223-24.
236. See supra Part III.A.
237. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 474 ("Colonial judges were often untrained in law. In
some colonial courts, more than one judge presided at trial, which made it difficult to give a
consistent charge to the jury. In such circumstances, juries often decided matters of law,
even in cases that had no political overtones."); see also id. at 479 ("Early American courts
were not well-adapted to judicial control either of fact or of law. Many judges were un-
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grand jury in Massachusetts in 1759 stated that in most matters the jurors
"need no explanation [because] your good sense and understanding will direct
ye ... "38
The surviving colonial insanity acquittals offer little evidence of the legal
standard that was used. For example, in 1770 in Virginia, Moses Riggs was sen-
tenced to death for murder. 39 However, due to his apparent insanity, "the
Verdict against him was disapproved of by the Court" and he was declared "a
fit Object of Mercy."1 0 In 1776, it was ordered that "Moses Riggs be dis-
charged from his Confinement in the publick Gaol.""4 In 1757 in New Jersey, a
court discharged Elizabeth Post after she was indicted for arson.4 2 The court
was "doubtful... whether she was not an idiot or lunatic" and so ordered "the
sheriff [to] inquire by the oaths of twelve good and lawful men of his bailiwick
whether the s'd Elizabeth Post was [a] lunatic or idiot."143 After the sheriff re-
turned the finding of lunacy, the court ordered that Post be discharged.' No
information is provided as to how the inquisition reached its determination nor
what characteristics of Post led the court to suspect she was an idiot or lunatic.
There are other similarly concise reports of colonial cases that acquit idiots and
lunatics for serious crimes.
45
trained in the law -some were clergymen or physicians, others were farmers or blacksmiths.
When judges lacked legal training, and law books were scarce, jurors must have seemed
equally capable of determining the law.").
238. Id. at 479 (citing Grand Jury Charge, 1759, reprinted in WUIIvAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZA-
TION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY,
176o-1830, at 26 (1975)).
239. 6 EXECUTIVE JOURNALS OF THE COUNCIL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 383 (Benjamin H. Hillman
ed., 1966).
240. Id.; see also RANKIN, supra note 209, at 113 n.6o ("In 1770, the Council recommended a par-
don for the murderer, Moses Riggs, on the grounds that he was insane.").
241. 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE 656 (Brent Tarter ed., 1975)
(1776).
a4. George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal Law and Procedure: The Royal Colony of New Jersey
1749-57, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 671, 685 (2005).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. For instance, in 1745 in Virginia, "Jack a Negro Man Slave" was spared because it seemed
"Doubtfull Whether he was Sensible of the crime for which he is Sentenced." CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA: [RECORDS OF] FINES, EXAMINATIONS OF CRIMINALS,
TRIALS OF SLAVES, ETC., FROM MARCH 1710 TO 1754 [RICHMOND COUNTY, VIRGINIA] 228 (Pe-
ter Charles Hoffer & William B. Scott eds., 1984). In 1754, William Sherrings was excused
for stealing from a church because he had "impaired Understanding." Id. at 248-49. In 1773,
Nathan Phillips was jailed instead of executed "because of his 'being a lunatick.'" RANKIN,
supra note 209, at 206. In 1733, Elizabeth Horton appears to have been acquitted because the
jury found that "before and at the time of committing the [murder] she was mad and is so
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These cases confirm the practice of idiocy acquittals in the colonies, but
they offer little evidence of who was considered an idiot for purposes of crimi-
nal liability. Based on our knowledge of common law idiocy acquittals more
generally, there is strong evidence that community reputation played a promi-
nent role in these acquittals. The next Part turns to the legal sources that were
used by the Framers; the rule promulgated in these sources helps illuminate
who was considered an idiot in the criminal context.
C. Identifying Idiots: Hale's Rule, the Framers' Rule
There is strong doctrinal evidence that the range of idiots' intellectual abili-
ties was broader than the narrow definition adopted by the Supreme Court in
Penry and Atkins. This is expressed most clearly in the work of Matthew Hale.
As discussed above, Hale's work "had more influence on lawyers of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth century than any other single work on the subject [of idi-
ocy]. " 46 Hale provided an illustration to help determine the level of mental
impairment that qualified an individual as an idiot for the purpose of criminal
liability: only a person who "hath yet ordinarily as great an understanding, as
ordinarily a child of fourteen hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason
or felony."" 7 In addition to community reputation, there is evidence that this
fourteen-year-old rule was used to determine idiocy in criminal cases in Eng-
land. ' 8
It is interesting that Hale set the age at fourteen for at least two reasons.
First, and most obviously, this level of intellectual functioning is far broader
than that contemplated under the Supreme Court's "profound and severe theo-
ry.,,49 The definition of idiocy that the Court used-the definition that
emerged from Goddard's IQ breakdown in the eugenics movement -held that
at the present time." DOUGLAS GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY
OF NEWYORK, 1691-1776, at 118 (1976).
246. WALKER, supra note 130, at 35.
247. Id. at 38.
248. See, e.g.,John Leck, Theft > Grand Larceny, 9th July 18oo, PROC. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S CENT.
CRIM. CT., 1674 TO 1913, (18OO), http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t18ooo7o9
-21-defend2o4&div=t18oo0709-21 [http://perma.cc/TgEF-FSM3] ("Gentlemen of the Jury,
you are here sworn on the part of the Crown, to inquire whether the prisoner at the bar is of
sound mind or not; by which oath, I understand, that you are to pronounce whether you
think the prisoner knows right from wrong; the rule laid down in our law books is this, that
if a person has the same sort of understanding that a child of fourteen years of age has, he is
then answerable to the laws of his country; now, by that rule, I understand, if he is a person
that knows right from wrong as well as an ordinary child of fourteen years of age does.").
249. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305, 332-33 (1989).
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idiots were people who "could not develop full speech and had mental ages be-
low three."" ° This is plainly not the severity of disability contemplated by
Hale's fourteen-year-old rule.
Second, the choice of fourteen had symbolic significance. During Hale's
time it was fairly well established that the ability to know good from evil was a
crucial test for a child on trial for a felony.2"' However, a child below the age of
seven-the age of reason-was exempted from such a trial."5 Nigel Walker
notes
the fact.., that the madman tended to be compared to the child under
the age of fourteen rather than the child under seven suggests that-at
first at least -it was failure to appreciate the true nature and quality of
his act that was supposed to be [the criminal madman's] defect. 3
Walker uses this incongruity to contrast the theoretical formalism of knowing
good from evil with the everyday reality of insanity acquittals:
In all but the exceptional case the madman obviously does mean to kill
or at least seriously injure his victim; in other words, what Bracton
called the 'will to harm' was not lacking .... Yet throughout the period
we are considering juries were, with the approval of judges, acquitting
people who committed insane but intentional acts. 4
According to Walker, setting the age at fourteen shielded defendants who pur-
posefully harmed their victims - a much more generous standard than the one
advanced by the Supreme Court.
Matthew Hale's fourteen-year-old rule is an important access point to co-
lonial conceptions of idiocy protections. As discussed below, this rule was du-
plicated in many of the authoritative resources used by the Framers, and it was
the sole method listed for determining idiocy in criminal matters.
One of the principal ways to establish the public meaning of idiocy in 1791
America is to examine legal dictionaries from the period. The Supreme Court
increasingly turns to dictionaries to understand the meaning of specific
250. GOuLD, supra note 94, at 158; see also Report of Committee on Classification of the Feeble-
Minded, supra note 95, at 61 ("(a) Idiots: Those so deeply defective that their mental devel-
opment does not exceed that of a normal child of about two years.").
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terms. 2 s For example, in District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Scalia relied
heavily on the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson's Dictionary and Timothy Cun-
ningham's "important 1771 legal dictionary" to determine the original meaning
of the phrase "keep and bear arms.,2s
6
In a recent article, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner identify specific legal
dictionaries that they believe best define the meaning of legal terms during par-
ticular time periods.1s7 For the time period 1750 to 18oo, Justice Scalia recom-
mends six legal dictionaries, one of which is Cunningham's 1771 edition, ss All
six of the recommended legal dictionaries provide entries for either "Ideots and
Lunaticks" or "Idiot." Five of the six provide extended discussions on the sub-
ject 9 while the sixth only provides a cursory definition.26, In each of the five,
there is a subsection that specifically addresses criminal liability for idiots. In all
of these five, the definitions have a similar structure, use similar wording, and
cite many of the same authorities.
In Cunningham's 1771 edition, subsection three is labeled: "How far their
want of understanding shall be said to prejudice them in civil and criminal cas-
es," and nested under that heading is the subsection "Criminal cases. ",, 6 ' This
subsection opens: "It is laid down as a general rule, that ideots and lunaticks,
being by reason of their natural disabilities incapable of judging between good
and evil, are punishable by no criminal prosecution whatsoever. '26' The sub-
section proceeds to note that an idiot or lunatic who commits suicide does not
255. See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L.
REv. 76 (2010); John Calhoun, Note, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme
Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L.J. 484 (2014).
256. 554 U.S. 570, 581-89 (2008).
257. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 419,
424 (2012).
258. Note that there are four authors, but two of the authors have multiple recommended edi-
tions, yielding six total legal dictionaries. Id. (recommending six law dictionaries for 1750-
18oo: TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAw-DICTIONARY, OR GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW, ON A MORE EXTENsIvE PLAN THAN ANY LAw-DICTIONARY HITH-
ERTO PUBLISHED, 2 vols. (2d ed. 1771; 3d ed. 1783); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 1772; loth ed. 1782); RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, 2 vols. (1792); WIL-
LIAM MARRIOT, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, 4 vols. (1797-1798) (an update of Cunningham)).
259. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 258 (2d ed. 1771; 3d ed. 1783); JACOB, supra note 258 ( 9 th ed. 1772;
loth ed. 1782); MARRIOT, supra note 258.
26o. BURN, supra note 258.
261. CUNNINGHAM (2d ed. 177), supra note 258.
262. Id. (citing 1 HAWKINS, supra note 192, at 2).
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qualify as felo de se.63 Subsequently, Cunningham's dictionary proceeds to a
thoughtful consideration regarding the difficulty of determining idiocy in
criminal matters:
The great difficulty in these cases is, to determine where a person shall
be said to be so far deprived of his sense and memory, as not to have
any of his actions imputed to him; or where, notwithstanding some de-
fects of this kind, he still appears to have so much reason and under-
standing as will make him accountable for his actions, which my Lord
Hale distinguishes between, and calls by the name of total and partial
insanity; and tho' it be difficult to define the invisible line that divides
perfect and partial insanity, yet, says he, it must rest upon circumstanc-
es, duly to be weighed and considered both by the judge and jury, lest
on the one side there be a kind of inhumanity towards the defects of
human nature, or on the other side too great an indulgence given to
great crimes; and the best measure he can think of is this: Such a per-
son, as laboring under melancholy distempers, hath yet ordinarily as
great understanding as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, is such
a person as may be guilty of treason or felony.264
This fourteen-year-old rule is the only method offered to determine idiocy
for purposes of criminal liability. 6s The four other dictionaries likewise cite
Hale's fourteen-year-old rule as the primary method for determining whether
an offender is an idiot and therefore immune from prosecution for a felony or
treason. Moreover, they track the language of Cunningham's 1771 edition al-





26S. Other parts of Cunningham's definition may seem to be in tension with this rule. For in-
stance, several pages earlier he says, "If one have understanding to measure a yard of cloth,
number twenty, rightly name the days of the week, or to beget a child, he shall not be
counted an idiot or natural fool, by the laws of the realm." However, this portion of the def-
inition cites Beverly's Case, a civil matter, and does not apply to criminal matters. Id. Hale's
fourteen-year-old nile, however, is specifically labeled for criminal matters.
266. Cunningham's 1783 edition duplicates his 1771 edition verbatim. The only differences are in
formatting: the capitalization of certain words (for example, judge to Judge); additional ital-
icization (total and partial insanity); a missing comma; and changed spelling (tho to
though). CUNNINGHAM, supra note 258. In Jacob's 1772 and 1782 editions, the criminal sec-
tion is the fifth, and the header is similar: "How far the want of understanding will excuse
in criminal cases." JACOB, supra note 258. The definition that follows is the same. The main
deviance is in italicization and the addition of the word "commonly." It reads: "Such a per-
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Although colonial trial records are unclear on the legal standard they used
to determine idiocy, as discussed above, some nineteenth-century trials explic-
itly relied on the fourteen-year-old rule. For instance, in 1838 a Delaware court
cited Hale's rule as the recommended standard to determine insanity in
criminal matters.26 7 There are additional nineteenth-century cases that cite
Hale's rule,26 8 as well as nineteenth-century legal scholars from the United
States269and England. 7°
Despite the paucity of the colonial trial records, there is evidence that the
notion of a mental age comparison - equating idiocy with childhood - was con-
ceptually intuitive for the colonists. For instance, a Massachusetts deposition in
1670 described an idiot by an age comparison:
[Deponent] and his sisters took a great deal of care and diligently in-
structed him in reading and he was also put to school, but he did not
gain much of what might have been expected .... In his ordenary im-
ployment he was incapashous that I neuar saw one of that age soe unfit
for larning & any work in which was needfull to haue discresion used. 27'
Likewise, a Charlestown court in 169o, described an idiot as "void of common
reason and understanding that is in other children of her age." 72 These records
son, as labouring under melancholy distempers, hath yet ordinarily as great understanding
as a child of fourteen years commonly hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or fel-
ony." Id. Marriot's dictionary also uses the same definition as Cunningham's with only mi-
nor differences. MARRIOT, supra note 258. The central difference is the header for the sub-
section, which changes "want of understanding" to "condition." It reads: "How far their
condition shall affect them in civil and criminal cases." Id.
267. Duffield v. Morris's Ex'r, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 375, 380 (1838).
a68. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 857 (Ala. 1887) (discussing the former influence held by
Hale's fourteen-year-old rule); State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591, 594 (1873) (recommending
the use of Hale's fourteen-year-old rule); Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, 475-76 (186o) (citing
Hale's fourteen-year-old rule); see also Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 332 (1847) (citing Hale
generally regarding mental capacity); see also DEUTSCH, supra note 96, at 392 (noting that
"Hale's test was widely used in English criminal cases for many years after his time.").
z6g. See, e.g., J.A.G. DAviS, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW, WITH AN EXPOSITION OF THE OFFICE
AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN VIRGINIA; INCLUDING FORMS OF PRACTICE 27-
28 (1838) (providing Hale's fourteen-year-old rule as the "best rule upon the subject").
270. See, e.g., HIGHMORE, supra note 81, at 141-42 (1822) ("[S]uch a person as ... hath yet ordi-
narily as great understanding as a child of fourteen years hath, is such a person as may be
guilty of felony or treason" (citing 1 HALE, supra note 14, at 30).
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indicate that Hale's comparison between idiocy and a young age (fourteen) was
not a foreign concept to the colonists.
There is much we still do not know about eighteenth-century idiocy pro-
tections. For instance, the historical record is unclear about the legal standard
used by the colonists in criminal trials with idiot defendants. Nonetheless, as
discussed above, we know that idiocy acquittals occurred and the community
reputation of an idiot likely played a large role.2 73 Moreover, the fourteen-year-
old rule provides strong doctrinal evidence that idiocy protections were more
expansive than argued by the Supreme Court in Penry and Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in Atkins. 74 Circumstantial evidence supports this reading. As noted
above, the colonists "undoubtedly relied on English definitions of idiocy and
methods to determine incompetency with which they were familiar.""5 As Ni-
gel Walker noted in his analysis of the Old Bailey Session Papers, late-
eighteenth-century England was marked by a statistically significant increase in
the success rate of the insanity defense.27 6 The colonists generally followed
English criminal law, and to the extent that they deviated from it, they moved
in the direction of leniency and offered alternatives to the death penalty.' Giv-
en this collective evidence, the most persuasive reading of the historical record
suggests that eighteenth-century protections for idiots were fairly strong.
Moreover, as argued in Part V, it appears likely that protections from the late
eighteenth century would protect some of the offenders whom we execute to-
day.
IV. RESTORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR: APPLYING
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PROTECTIONS TODAY
Part IV asks if there are people on death row today who would have been
shielded by idiocy protections in 1791. The answer is likely yes. It then explores
how the Court could enforce these protections. Although it is challenging to
apply historical standards in a contemporary setting, the fourteen-year-old rule
has some natural modern analogues, namely the concept of "mental age." As
this Part explains, the concept of mental age, although it faces complications in
both the fields of law and psychology, serves as a useful starting point for the
application of idiocy protections today.
273. See supra Part III.B.
274- See supra Part III.C.
275. Wickham, Idiocy and the Law in Colonial New England, supra note 53, at 1o6.
276. See WALKER, supra note 232.
277. See CHAPIN, supra note 41, at 8.
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It should be clear that restoring the original meaning approach to the
Eighth Amendment does not mean adopting ancient models of care or retro-
grade psychiatric diagnoses. Rather, it means gaining historical evidence about
the characteristics of individuals the Framers and ratifying states meant to pro-
tect and then abstracting those principles to protect, at minimum, similar peo-
ple today. In addition, restoring the original meaning approach does not re-
quire disrupting the evolving standards of decency approach. Restoring the
floor simply establishes immutable, baseline protections below which the
evolving standards of decency must not fall. Therefore, the floor can only cre-
ate new protections to the extent that it exceeds the protections already provid-
ed by evolving standards of decency. Based on this Note's historical analysis, it
is likely that restoring the constitutional floor would protect a segment of peo-
ple with intellectual impairments who are currently sentenced to death.7 s
A. Why Idiocy Protections Matter Today
It may be helpful to start with a recent example. In light of the foregoing
discussion, it is highly likely that in 1791 it would have been considered "cruel"
to execute Freddie Hall. Hall is a prisoner on death row who was convicted of
participating in the 1978 kidnap, rape, and murder of Karol Hurst.27 9 Due to
questions involving Hall's intellectual disability, the Supreme Court heard his
case, Hall v. Florida, in 2014 . 80 Hall is illiterate, unable to perform basic arith-
metic, and has never been able to hold a steady job78' Growing up, he was con-
sidered intellectually disabled by his entire community, including his siblings,
friends, and teachers.sz Furthermore, although expert witnesses differed re-
garding Hall's precise "mental age," all of them diagnosed him with a mental
278. Alternatively, one might argue, as John Stinneford does, that the original meaning of the
Eighth Amendment can replace the "evolving standards of decency" approach. Stinneford
argues that, based on his historical research on the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause, the Court could replace the "evolving standards of decency" with the
"original meaning" approach and reach substantially the same results in cases like Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). See John F. Stinneford, Evolving Awayfrom Evolving Standards
of Decency, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 87, 87 (2010). While Stinneford's line of argument may hold
promise, this Note does not pursue it.
279. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 199o (2014) ("On February 21, 1978, Freddie Lee Hall,
petitioner here, and his accomplice, Mark Ruffin, kidnaped, beat, raped, and murdered Ka-
rol Hurst, a pregnant, 21-year-old newlywed.").
28o. Id.
281. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-1o882).
282. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1991.
2792
124:274 6 201 5
COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS FOR "IDIOTS"
age below a fourteen-year-old.8s Based on these characteristics, it is likely that
Hall would have been considered an idiot in 1791 and therefore exempted from
execution.
Hall is a strong case for idiocy protection; he qualifies as an idiot under al-
most any common law test. His inability to read and perform basic arithmetic
would likely qualify him as an idiot under Fitzherbert's definition., s4 The col-
lective understanding of his community that he was intellectual disabled would
be probative under the community reputation analysis described in Part III.B.
Finally, Hall's low mental age would likely qualify him as an idiot under the
fourteen-year-old rule that was accepted common law doctrine in 1791.
Hall's case illustrates why common law idiocy protections are relevant to-
day: states continue to execute people with significant mental impairments.
Although Atkins v. Virginia proscribed capital punishment for people with in-
tellectual disabilities, it left to the states "the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction." 8s As Carol and Jordan Steiker
argued in 2008, many states adopted stringent procedures governing the de-
termination of intellectual disability, thereby compromising the substantive
guarantee of Atkins. s6 The Supreme Court's ruling in Hall v. Florida supports
this argument.8s
In Hall, the Court held that Florida's threshold requirement for proving in-
tellectual disability - an IQof seventy or below - was unconstitutionally rig-
id. s8 Hall is significant because it is the first time the Court stated that Atkins
does not give states "unfettered discretion" to define the scope of the constitu-
tional protection afforded to people with intellectual disabilities.28 However,
283. Id. (noting that "Hall's counsel recalled that Hall could not assist in his own defense because
he had 'a mental ... level much lower than his age,' at best comparable to the lawyer's 4-
year-old daughter. A number of medical clinicians testified that, in their professional opin-
ion, Hall was 'significantly retarded' ... and had levels of understanding 'typically [seen]
with toddlers"') (citations omitted).
284. See FITZHERBERT, supra note 125, at 533 ("And he who shall be said to be a sot and idiot from
his birth, is such a person who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who
was his father or mother, nor how old he is, &c., so as it may appear that he hath no under-
standing of reason what shall be for his profit, or what for his loss. But if he hath such un-
derstanding, that he know and understand his letters, and do read by teaching or infor-
mation of another man, then it seemeth he is not a sot nor a natural idiot."); supra Part II.C.
285. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
286. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance and Procedure
in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 721, 724-31 (2008).
287. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1986.
288. Id. at 2001.
289. Id. at 1989.
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Hall addressed only a narrow issue-the seventy-point IQ cutoff 9 °-and
leaves states with considerable flexibility to define intellectual disability. In-
deed, the ruling does not necessarily shield Hall himself from execution; it
merely holds that his IQof seventy-one does not foreclose further exploration
of intellectual disability.29 And notably for this discussion, the Court's reason-
ing relied entirely on the "evolving standards of decency" method and did not
mention historical idiocy protections.29
In light of this Note's historical analysis, death penalty jurisprudence
should give renewed focus to the public meaning of idiocy in 1791. Today, all
death penalty protections for people with intellectual disabilities are provided
through the "evolving standards of decency" approach to the Eighth Amend-
ment, as outlined in Atkins and Hall.293 The original meaning approach to
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence currently provides no special protections for
people, like Hall, who have substantial intellectual impairments. The constitu-
tional floor is missing. This Note's historical reassessment suggests that some
prisoners on death row today who are not protected by Atkins or Hall may
nonetheless be protected by eighteenth-century idiocy protections.
B. Enforcing Idiocy Protections Today
Although several different principles can be abstracted from this Note's his-
torical analysis, this Part focuses on one of them: the fourteen-year-old rule.
The requirement that the offender have "as great understanding, as ordinarily a
child of fourteen years hath" is intuitively analogous to the concept of "mental
age." 94 Broadly defined, mental age gauges defendants' "incapacity to function
2go. See Lizette Alvarez & John Schwartz, On Death Row With Low LQ, and New Hope for a Re-
prieve, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2o14/o5/31/us/on-death-row
-with-low-iq-and-new-hope-for-a-reprieve.html [http://perma.cc/STM6-GGNE] (noting
that the ruling in Hall v. Florida "affects roughly 30 death row inmates" and that "[t]he
number is low").
z91. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 199o ("Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score
of 70 or less. If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further ex-
ploration of intellectual disability is foreclosed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates
an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is
unconstitutional.").
292. Id. at 1992 ("To enforce the Constitution's protection of human dignity, this Court looks to
the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' (citation
omitted)).
293. See supra Part I.A.
294. 1 HALE, supra note 14, at 30.
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at an adult level cognitively and morally despite [their] chronological age."29 It
would seem that the Court could employ the mental age concept and adopt a
per se rule that prohibits the execution of people with a mental age below four-
teen. As discussed below, promulgation of this rule might protect a segment of
capital offenders currently on death row. As of June 2014, approximately thirty
of the last one hundred executed offenders were diagnosed with some degree of
mental disability.296 Some of them appear to qualify for idiocy protections
based on their mental ages.
Consider Robert Woodall. He is currently sentenced to death for the kid-
nap, rape, and murder of Sarah Hansen. 97 Woodall is mentally impaired and
"function[s] at the age equivalency of an ii or 12 year-old." 9s Furthermore, he
has displayed other symptoms throughout his life that are highly associated
with idiocy. For instance, Woodall has been incontinent since childhood and
"defecate[s] without warning." 29 9 In the common law, "befouling" oneself was
associated with idiocy.300
Other capital cases similarly cite defendants' low mental ages, but courts
often struggle to determine the legal relevance of such evidence. For instance,
Thomas Bowling is currently sentenced to death in Kentucky for two murders
from 1990.31 Bowling was diagnosed with the mental age of an eleven-year-
old.3"2 However, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected his mental retardation
claim because, inter alia, he did "not cite[] any published authority prohibiting
the death penalty based upon 'juvenile mental age."' 30 3
295. James Fife, Mental Capacity, Minority, and Mental Age in Capital Sentencing: A Unified Theory
of Culpability, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 237, 251 (2005).
296. Robert J. Smith, Sophie Cull & Zoe Robinson, The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L. J.
1221, 1229 (2014) ("One-third of the last hundred executed offenders were burdened by in-
tellectual disability, borderline intellectual functioning, or traumatic brain injury- a similar-
ly debilitating intellectual impairment.").
297. Death Row Inmates, KY. DEP'T CORR. (2015), http://corrections.ky.gov/communityinfo
/Pages/DeathRowlnmates.aspx [http://perma.cc/8FXE-NGZL].
298. Brief for Respondent at 2, White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (No. 12-794).
299. Id. at 4.
300. See, e.g., John Stevens, Killing > Murder, 9 th April 1766, PRoc. OLD BAILEY: LONDON'S CENT.
CRIM. CT., 1674 TO 1913, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.spid=t766o4o9-67&div
=t1766o4o9-67 [http://perma.cc/2WMA- 33QZ] (determining the idiocy of the deceased be-
cause he was "really dumb" and used to "befoul himself").
301. See Death Row Inmates, supra note 297..
302. Brief for Appellant at 1-3, Bowling v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W.3 d 577 (Ky. 2oo6) (No.
2005-SC-000712).
303. Bowling, 224 S.W. 3d at 584.
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Richard Henyard was executed in Florida in 2008 for capital crimes com-
mitted when he was eighteen years old.304 During the capital phase of his trial,
the court found that Henyard "functions at the emotional level of a thirteen
year old and is of low intelligence.""3 5 However, the court determined that
these findings reflected "nonstatutory mitigating circumstances" and therefore
accorded them "little weight. ''3,6 This decision was upheld by the Florida Su-
preme Court in 1996,307 and Henyard was denied habeas relief by both the
Florida Supreme Court in 20043°' and the Eleventh Circuit in 2006.309 Howev-
er, Judge Barkett wrote separately "to address the separate and troubling issue
of Henyard's mental age":3P0
As with children and the mentally retarded, mental age is not the result
of a failure to abide by an expected standard, but an incapacity to evalu-
ate and comprehend it. The mere fact of a defendant's chronological
age should not qualify a defendant for death where the measures of ca-
pacity render him lacking in culpability. Although it may not be directly
before us, at some juncture this issue must be addressed.311
Today on death row there are other prisoners -similar to Henyard, Woodall,
and Bowling -who have mental ages below fourteen.312
Although mental age seems a straightforward way to apply the fourteen-
year-old rule today, the approach faces several challenges. The concept of
"mental age" largely fell into legal disuse after the Supreme Court's ruling in
Penry. In Part IV.C of Penry- a portion of the opinion adhered to only by Jus-
tice O'Connor-Justice O'Connor examined and rejected the concept of mental
304. Richard Henyard, OFF. CLARK COUNTY PROSECUTING Arr'Y, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org
/html/death/US/henyardll22.htm [http://perma.cc/5NSL-CNC6].
305. Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 244 (Fla. 1996).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Henyard v. State, 883 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2004).
309. Henyard v. McDonough, 459 F. 3 d 1217 (i1th Cit. 2006).
310. Id. at 1247 (Barkett, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 1248-49.
312. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1265 (Fla. 2005) (mental age of seven); Suttles
v. State, 2014 WL 2902271, slip op. at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 25, 2014) (mental age of be-
tween seven and nine); Brief for Appellant, People v. Woodruff, No. S115378, 2011 WL
4440789, at *28 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (noting that a clinical psychologist examined Woodruff
in 2003 and testified that he had "the mental age of someone 9 or so years old"); Reply
Brief of Appellant, Hill v. Florida, No. SC687o6, 2006 WL 868083, at *13-14 (Fla. Jan. 5,
2006) (mental age of approximately ten).
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age as a consideration in capital sentencing.313 Although Penry was diagnosed
with a mental age of six and a half,314 Justice O'Connor found the concept of
mental age problematic for four reasons, and concluded that it "should not be
adopted as a line-drawing principle in our Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence." 31 Her objections were: first, that the trial court made no factual finding
regarding Penry's age; second, that mental age diagnosis begins to plateau at
the age of fifteen or sixteen; third, that some courts had already rejected mental
age; and fourth, adopting the concept of mental age might deprive people with
intellectual disabilities of other rights. 6 The Supreme Court has not discussed
mental age at length since Penry.1 7
These four objections are ably rebutted in James Fife's article, Mental Ca-
pacity, Minority, and Mental Age in Capital Sentencing: A Unified Theory of Cul-
pability."'8 Fife notes that the first objection was specific to Penty's procedural
history, and is no reason to reject the concept of mental age in general.3' 9 The
second objection -that mental age begins to plateau at the age of 15 or 16 -
does not affect the fourteen-year-old rule discussed in this Note. Fife argues
that the third objection is unpersuasive because Penry was a case of first im-
pression, and the cases Justice O'Connor cited were scattered and outdated."
The final objection is similarly unconvincing. Fife points out the "pure unlike-
lihood that legislatures or courts would model everyday legal status decisions
on the basis of capital sentencing factors.""'
The mental age concept resurfaced in the legal landscape in the wake of
Roper v. Simmons in 2oo5." In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of individuals who were under eighteen
313. Penry v. L
314. Id. at 339.




ynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 339-40 (1989).
Id. at 339-40.
See, e.g., McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 1254, 1255 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (citing Justice Stevens's opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part in Penry, and noting that McCollum's "mental age of a 9-year-old" was one among
several factors contributing to his belief that McCollum's execution was unconstitutional);
see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002) (citing the dissent in the Virginia Su-
preme Court, which appealed to Atkins's mental age).
Fife, supra note 295, at 263-65.
319. Id. at 263.
320. Id. at 263-64.
321. Id. at 264.
322. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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years of age at the time of their capital crime.323 The Court arrived at this deci-
sion based on the "evolving standards of decency" approach to the Eighth
Amendment.3" In dissent, Justice O'Connor noted that it was not considered
"cruel and unusual" to execute an individual below eighteen years old in
1791.32s After Roper, several death row prisoners brought actions attempting to
combine Roper and Atkins. They argued that these holdings should merge to
protect not only those with chronological ages below eighteen, but also those
with mental ages below eighteen.26 The lower courts refused to extend Roper
to include mental age and categorically rejected these petitions.2 7
The legal status of mental age remains unsettled. Although many courts re-
ject mental age, others continue to invoke it. For instance, in Atkins v. Virginia
the Supreme Court cited the dissenting justices of the Virginia Supreme Court,
who had written that "the imposition of the sentence of death upon a defend-
ant who has a mental age of a child of 9-12 is excessive" and "incredulous as a
matter of law. " 3 8 More recently, in March 2015, Judge Beverly Martin of the
Eleventh Circuit wrote in dissent that a defendant's claim-that his "mental
and emotional age of less than eighteen prohibits his execution" - satisfied the
certificate of appealability standard mandated under federal habeas law.329
Numerous other cases and briefs, as mentioned above, reference the mental age
of defendants.
Mental age is somewhat unsettled in the psychological literature as well.
The concept originated at the beginning of the twentieth century as a way to
323. Id. at 578.
324. See id. at S61, 563.
325. See id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
326. See Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84, 177-8o (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (reviewing Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 3d S77 (Ky. 2006) (holding that Roper did not prohibit the execu-
tion of offenders with the mental age of a juvenile and citing Mitchell v. State, 235 P. 3d 640,
659 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) ("We find the Bowling decision well reasoned and persua-
sive."))); Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d S79, 584 (Fla. 2006) ("Roper only prohibits the execution
of those defendants whose chronological age is below eighteen."); State v. Campbell, 983 So.
2d 81o, 830 (La. 2008) (rejecting the application of Roper to mental age); see also Suttles v.
State, No. E2013-01O16-CCA-R 3-PD, 2014 WL 2902271, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23,
2014) (noting that petitioner makes an "Atkins-Roper Claim" to argue his execution is un-
constitutional because his mental age is below eighteen).
327. See supra note 326.
328. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002) (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d
312, 321 (2000) (Hassell, J., dissenting)).
329. Melton v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 778 F.3d 1234, 1237 (2015) (Martin, J., dissenting).
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calculate scores in early standardized intelligence tests.330 The subsequent de-
velopments in the mental age concept are well documented-at least from its
origins until the 198os.3' There is surprisingly little literature that discusses
mental age as a concept over the past several decades. Nonetheless, various
contemporary psychological studies continue to use iterations of the concept in
practice. 332
In addition, numerous modern psychological tests generate "age equivalen-
cy" scores. For example, the Second Edition of the Vineland Adaptive Behav-
ioral Scales (Vineland II) tests the social adaptive functioning of people with
intellectual disabilities and measures their performance along a spectrum of ag-
es.333 Vineland II assesses four adaptive skills: communication, daily living
skills, socialization, and motor skills (the latter being optional for people over
age six).3 34 The test is "age-based and is defined by the standards of others...
[representing] the typical performance rather than the potential or ability of
the individual. ''33' By providing the age equivalency of its test takers, Vineland
II would likely be useful in implementing the fourteen-year-old rule.
330. JOHN M. REISMAN, A HISTORY OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 60 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that the
mental age concept was first introduced by Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon in 19o8 as a
score for their intelligence test); see also ROBERT M. THORNDIKE & DAVID F. LOHMAN, A
CENTURY OF ABiLuITY TESTING 35 (1990) (describing how mental age was a conceptual build-
ing block of IQ. Mental Age/Chronological Age = Intelligence Quotient).
331. See, e.g., THORNDIKE & LOHMAN, supra note 330 at 35, 50-54, 79. See generally Boake, supra
note 89.
332. See, e.g., Barbara Caplan et al., Developmental Level and Psychopathology: Comparing Children
with Developmental Delays to Chronological and Mental Age Matched Controls, 37 RES. IN DE-
VELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 143, 146 (2015) (calculating mental age using the formula MA =
IO1oo x CA, where CA is chronological age). See also Helma B.M. van Gameren-Oosterom
et al., Development, Problem Behavior, and Quality ofLife in a Population Based Sample of Eight-
Year-Old Children with Down Syndrome, PLOS ONE, July 2011, at 1, which calculates devel-
opmental age for children using
18 subtests, grouped into the scales: verbal, perceptual, quantitative, memory and
motor skills. The verbal, perceptual and quantitative scales are combined to form
the general cognitive scale. A developmental age is calculated based on the various
scale scores. To prevent an excessive influence of one of the subscales on the de-
velopmental age, the 18 subtests are each representing one competence in order to
test a specific ability of the child and not a broad range of abilities, i.e. the test is
developed so that level of verbal ability will minimally influence test-scores on
other domains measured.
Id. at 2.
333- Sara S. Sparrow, Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLINICAL NEURO-
PSYCHOLOGY 2618, 2618-19 (Jeffrey S. Kreutzer et al. eds., 2011).
334- Id.
335. Id. at 2620.
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Similarly, the Fourth Edition of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(PPVT- 4 ) provides age- and grade-based standard scores. 336 The PPVT, the
first edition of which debuted in the 1950s, provides "excellent reliability and
validity" in testing receptive verbal skills.337 Although the test should not sub-
stitute for IQ testing, its scores correlate with 10 scores and can provide some
general guidance regarding a mental age conversion.33 Using the PPVT-4's
Table for age twenty-five to thirty-one, the following IQ.to mental age conver-
sions result: IQof 5o corresponds to a mental age of 7 years and 3 months; IQ
of 70 corresponds to a mental age of lo years and 5 months; IQ-of 75 corre-
sponds to a mental age of 12 years and 2 months; and an IQ.of 8o corresponds
to a mental age of 14.3 11 In addition to the PPVT-4, other methods exist for
generating mental age calculations based on IQ.scores 4° or grade equivalen-
336. Nathan Henninger, Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLINICAL NEURO-
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 333, at 1889, 1889.
337. Id. at 189o.
338. ESTHER STRAUSS ET AL., A COMPENDIUM OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS: ADMINISTRATION,
NORMS, AND COMMENTARY 947-48 (3d ed. 2006) (outlining the correlation between PPVTs
and IQ.scores but noting that the PPVT cannot substitute for an IQ test).
339. E-mail from Stephen Greenspan, Professor Emeritus of Educ. Psychology, Univ. of Conn.,
to author (Apr. 5, 2015, 6:27 PM) (on file with author).
34o. There is also a somewhat crude formula for converting IQscores to a mental age that uses a
denominator of 16. See Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall
v. Florida and the Possibility of a "Scientific Stare Decisis," 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 424
n.62 (2014) ("Generally, to convert an IQ.score into a rough mental age equivalent, the IQjs
multiplied by 16, and then divided by ioo. Thus, an IQof 75 equates roughly with a mental
age of twelve." (citation omitted)). As Stephen Greenspan explains it:
Today, test scoring software and conversion tables do not routinely produce MA
[mental age] scores; a widely used method for determining rough MA equiva-
lents for different IQscores is to use 16 as the denominator (because most IQ
sub-tests tend to level off around age 16) in a modified ratio calculation. A couple
of variants of this method can be used but one common one is to "multiply the
[obtained] IQby 16, and then divide by ioo. So an adult with a 50 IQis function-
ing at roughly an 8-year-old level."
E-mail from Stephen Greenspan, Professor Emeritus of Educ. Psychology, Univ. of Conn.,
to author (Apr. 4, 2015, 11:58 AM) (on file with author) (quoting Jonathan Rich, Intelligence
Testing, PSYCHOL. TESTING, http://www.psychologicaltesting.com/iqtest.htm [http://perma
.cc/X95A-ULCH]). Using this technique an IQof 84 corresponds with a mental age of thir-
teen and a half, yielding a slightly more generous IQrange than the PPVT- 4 equivalencies.
E-mail from Stephen Greenspan, Professor Emeritus of Educ. Psychology, Univ. of Conn.,
to author (Mar. 31, 2015, 11:17 AM) (on file with author). Note, however, that this difference
falls within the normal standard error of measurement for IQtests, which is five points. Am.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FIFTH
EDITION: DSM-5 37 (2013).
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cies.M4 Although these IQOto-mental-age conversion techniques are by no
means unequivocal, they help to illustrate that the fourteen-year-old rule likely
captures a borderline group of intellectually disabled people who are not pro-
tected today.
Enforcing historical idiocy protections in the modern context will come
with challenges. Complications inhere when transporting historical concepts.
To address these challenges, more scholarship is necessary-scholarship that
looks both backward and forward. Additional historical research will help fill
gaps in our knowledge about idiocy protections; additional legal and psycho-
logical scholarship will help apply those protections to capital sentencing to-
day.
More historical research will help supplement our understanding of idiocy
protections at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted. For instance, ad-
ditional scholarship can refine our conception of the fourteen-year-old rule.
Historical sensitivity asks that we consider not just the understanding of an or-
dinary fourteen-year-old, but the understanding of an ordinary fourteen-year-
old in 1791. As noted above, many of the colonial trial records are too terse and
descriptively vague to provide much help. Social science (and intuition) sug-
gests that a fourteen-year-old in 1791 would be more mature than a fourteen-
year-old today."42 However, a sufficiently rigorous answer calls for more careful
work in social history. On a more basic level, what was the public meaning of
the word "understanding" in 179 1?143 As applied to a fourteen-year-old, did the
concept of understanding encompass only intelligence? Or did it also consider
social adaptive functioning? Dictionaries from the time period provide some
341. For instance, until 2013, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
described a person with Mild Mental Retardation as one who could "acquire academic skills
up to approximately the sixth-grade level." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION: DSM-1V-TR 43 (1994). As ex-plained in a report by the American Psychological Association, the DSM "indicates, even a
person with only 'mild' mental retardation, as the term is defined in the Manual [sixth-
grade level], has a mental age below that of a teenager." AM. PSYCHOLOGICALASS'N, REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2005), http://
www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/mental-disability-and-death-penalty.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2E87-SFEX]. The report explains that academic skills up to the sixth-grade level
"amount[s] to the maturity of a twelve year-old." Id. at 2 n.8.
342. See, e.g., Jeffrey Jenson Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 470 (2000) (noting that industrial
societies allow "prolonged adolescence" (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND
CRISIS (1968))).
343. Recall that Hale's rule says only a person who "hath yet ordinarily as great an understanding,
as ordinarily a child of fourteen hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or felony."
1 HALE, supra note 14, at 30 (emphasis added).
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context; 44 however, the word "understanding" would benefit from a more sus-
tained treatment, such as John Stinneford's extended analysis on the eight-
eenth-century meaning of the word "unusual.""
Similarly, joint work in the fields of law and psychology will help judges
apply idiocy protections today (again, simply as a constitutional floor -not re-
placing the evolving standards of decency). The concept of mental age holds
promise, but it may be insufficiently nuanced to fully capture the protections of
the fourteen-year-old rule. As an alternative, psychologists may continue to ex-
plore innovative age comparison concepts, such as "adaptive age." 346 According
to Stephen Greenspan and his coauthors, a new construct of adaptive age
might "enable the courts to understand both the potential and limitations of
adults at different developmental levels, while also emphasizing ... that intel-
ligence as applied to everyday (adaptive) living is a much broader and varied
construct than intelligence as captured by IQscores." 7
These complications are not insurmountable barriers. The Court could take
various approaches to understand and enforce eighteenth-century idiocy pro-
tections. 8 Although there will be procedural hurdles, such challenges should
not vitiate our efforts to enforce the underlying substantive right.
34. See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (providing
three definitions for the noun "understanding": 1) "Intellectual powers; faculties of the
mind, especially those of knowledge and judgment"; 2) "skill"; 3) "Intelligence; terms of
communication"); SAMUEL JOHNSON, 2 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1770)
(providing a nearly identical definition).
345. See Stinneford, supra note 8.
346. Stephen Greenspan et al., Intelligence Involves Risk-Awareness and Intellectual Disability In-
volves Risk-Unawareness: Implications of a Theory of Common Sense, 36 J. INTELL. & DEVELOP-
MENTAL DISABILITY 242, 249 (2011).
347. Id. (internal citations omitted).
348. For instance, the Supreme Court might reuse its technique from Atkins v. Virginia. In Atkins,
the Court announced a substantive right-it is unconstitutional to execute a person with
mental retardation-but did little to explain the concept. See 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In-
stead, the Court left to the states "the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction." Id. at 317 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17
(1986)). The Court could do likewise today. That is, it could announce the substantive
right -the fourteen-year-old rule -but leave to the states the task of enforcing the constitu-
tional restriction. While this approach boasts certain merit, such as using the states as labor-
atories of democracy to unpack the meaning of idiocy protections, it also comes at a cost. As
the Court held in Hall v. Florida, certain states provided overly stringent procedures for
identifying intellectual disability, and thereby compromised the guarantee of Atkins. See 134
S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014). If the Court reuses that technique with the fourteen-year-old rule,
it is likely that the floor will not be restored in some states -at least not until the Court in-
tervenes for a second time, as it did in Hall.
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CONCLUSION
This Note makes three contributions. First, it shows that the Supreme
Court's historical analysis of eighteenth-century protections for idiots was
deeply flawed. Second, it offers an historical account that strongly indicates
that those protections cast a broader net than acknowledged by the Court. And
third, based on this historical reassessment, it reveals that there are some pris-
oners with intellectual disabilities on death row today who likely would have
been protected from execution in 1791. Ultimately, this Note's findings may
seem modest. It appears that a small segment of capital prisoners qualify for
additional protections based on this historical reassessment. However, from
the perspective of those prisoners, this new historical analysis may be vitally
important.
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